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THE GENEALOGY OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN LATIN AMERICA:
A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE ADVERSARIAL REFORMS IN THE REGION
By: Daniel Pulecio-Boek*t
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether there is a regional consensus in
Latin America about the necessity of replacing inquisitorial systems.
Thus, the question one needs to ask is whether the Latin American
jurisdictions that have reformed their Criminal Procedure Codes to
implement an adversarial system have "followed" a trend. In other
words, are nations acting according to a commonly held belief that reform is compulsory because one criminal procedure structure is fundamentally better than the other?
If this is the case, one would expect to find that all the Latin
America states that have experienced "adversarial" or "accusatorial"
* LL.B from the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (Colombia); graduated with various honors. LL.B from the University of the Basque Country (Spain); graduated
first in the class. Masters Degree in Philosophy from the Pontificia Universidad
Javeriana. (Thesis pending). LL.M. from Harvard Law School; LL.M. Paper received Honors. Formerly practiced in Colombia for nearly 4 years as a litigator and
consultant with the firm Sampedro & Riveros Abogados. Later practiced as an
international lawyer at the firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (Washington D.C.) Currently part of the White Collar and Enforcement practice group at
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Washington D.C.) (Admission to the
New York State Bar pending.) Author of the books Crimes Against the Social and
Economic Order, and The Dynamic Burden of Proof in Criminal Matters. Author of
several articles and essays published nationally and internationally. Former Professor at the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. dpulecio@gmail.com.
t This piece is the result of nearly one year of research at Harvard Law School
while earning an LL.M. A longer and more detailed version was presented to the
program as my official LL.M. Paper for graduation. I would like to thank very
specially Professor Lloyd Weinreb, for serving as my Paper supervisor. His constant guidance, profound analytic capability and encyclopedic knowledge of the
law, made this paper substantially stronger. I would also like to thank Professors
Maximo Langer and Julio Maier for taking the time to provide importance advice
regarding the general architecture of this paper. Likewise, this paper was possible
in great part thanks to the comprehensive knowledge of criminal procedure and
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me. Lastly, I want to very warmly thank the LL.M. program at Harvard Law
School for their support in the various stages of drafting this paper.
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criminal procedure reforms have identical resulting Codes. I discovered something different. This paper shows that there is no such thing
as "adversarial systems," at least in the context of Latin American
comparative criminal procedure. It is true that every country promoted its reform as "adversarial." However, the resulting laws in all
Latin American jurisdictions have very little in common, and what
they do have in common, has nothing to do with what scholars tell us
we should understand as "adversarial."
The only truly new universal trait I was able to find as a product of the reforms was prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion is the only legal notion that appeared in the region as a
consequence of the reforms, and it is the only feature that appeared in
all the reforms. This led me to trace the genealogy of discretion in
Latin America. I thought it would be interesting to find out where this
notion of affording prosecutors discretionary powers came from, as it
was the only notion present in all fifteen Latin American "adversarial"
criminal procedure reforms.
I found it was directly imitated from German law. Furthermore, I discovered authors suggesting that Germany itself, borrowed-and adapted-prosecutorial discretion, from Anglo-American
criminal procedure systems. Thus, I will conclude that Latin America's
adversarial Reform Movement looked for inspiration in a Continent
that did not have accusatorial models, and ended up copying-as the
central trait of the reform era-an institution developed outside the
Continent.
Following the ideas stated above, this paper contains four
chapters. In the first chapter I explore the inquisitorial/adversarial dichotomy. In other words, I will reproduce what the main scholars in
the field have understood as "typically adversarial" and "typically inquisitorial." I hope to show, at least in theory, what can be construed
as an "adversarial" criminal procedure system. Then I will show that
leading scholars and commentators have undoubtedly categorized the
Latin American Reform Movement as "adversarial." Therefore, I will
prove that the express purpose of reforms in the region was to leave
behind inquisitorial models of criminal procedure, and to replace them
with adversarial ideals and institutions.
The history of the Movement in the region-which I will briefly
narrate-is also helpful to understand this explicit purpose. I will call
this discourse, the discourse holding that the region uniformly and
consistently sought to replace inquisitorial models with adversarial
systems, hence, embracing the features advertised in academia as
"typically adversarial": the mainstream discourse.
At the end of the first chapter I will compare the concrete rules
included in each of the new Codes resulting from the reforms. Further,
I compare these new Codes with the traits enlisted by scholars as "ad-
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versarial." This comparison allows me to discover that the normative
features that are commonly shared across the region either existed
before the Reform Movement or, in any event, are not a direct consequence of it. With one exception, there are no new traits arising as a
result of the Movement that can be found in all the Codes.
In the second chapter I will explore the conclusions of the first
chapter. The comparison undertaken before will lead me to conclude
that there was no such thing as an "adversarial" reform in Latin
America. Each jurisdiction understood differently what it meant to
have an "adversarial system." Only one "adversarial" feature appears
in all the reforms. The rest of the traits portrayed by academics as
"adversarial," either do not appear at all in the region, or appear only
in some Codes. Therefore, I will argue that only one universal trait
appeared after the Reform Movement in all the new Codes:
prosecutorial discretion.
The third chapter focuses on the genealogy of prosecutorial discretion in Latin America. Where did it come from? What was its
source? I was able to identify that discretion in the region was first
introduced by the 1986 Draft for a new Federal Criminal Procedure
Code in Argentina. The 1986 Draft, in turn, directly used German law
as inspiration for embracing prosecutorial discretion. When I turn to
German law, I find that-at least according to some scholars-discretion was copied from Anglo-American systems. This leads me to compare discretion in Latin America with discretion in the U.S.
In conclusion, I will show that Latin America adopted discretion, as the only universal trait present in all "adversarial" reforms,
from German law, when discretion had not originated-and was not
widely practiced-in Europe. Finally, I suggest that discretion reflects
the level of trust that cultures award to their public officials.

1.

THE ADVERSARIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA

1.1.

Inquisitorialv. Adversarial'

If one analyzes the history of criminal procedure, one could
eventually argue, as many have, that it has had, from a comparative
1

Cf. MuJAN

R.

DmAsKA,

THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND

STATE AUTHORITY.

A

(1986). Professor Damaska's book
is, in my opinion, the most extraordinary text published thus far in the field of
comparative procedure. It opens up infinite lines of investigation and broadens
without limits any current debate about legal process design. However, in my
opinion, the book presents an abstract view of judicial systems. See id. at 3-4
(setting aside the adversarial/inquisitorial dichotomy and, in turn, asserting that
"only the core meaning of the opposition remains reasonably certain."). Beyond
that core meaning, it is uncertain what those terms signify. Damaska points out
that authors tend to describe each model by enlisting a collection of features, but
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS
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perspective, only two systems: the inquisitorial and the adversarial.
Some authors hold that criminal procedure laws can only fall under
one of those two structures, in accordance with the system adopted. Of
course, it has become increasingly clear that it is almost impossible to
find a jurisdiction with a system that is purely adversarial or purely
inquisitorial.2 After all, what is "purely" adversarial? Or furthermore,
what is "adversarial?"3 It seems then that criminal procedure systems
are becoming a mix of features borrowed from both of the two classical
schemes.

Leading commentators in Latin America claim that the adversary system is consistent with a "republican system of political
power."4 It is not clear what can be understood by a "republican system" but one could conclude it is a reference to political cultures that
embrace democratic values and the Rule of Law. Thus it governed
criminal procedure legislation in Greece, Rome, Germanic Law until
this only makes the dichotomy more uncertain and ambiguous. Id. at 16-17.
Focusing on the classical dichotomy he explains that any legal process (civil,
criminal or administrative) can be (and should be) understood and analyzed
within broader frameworks. Those frameworks are the structures of authority in a
given jurisdiction and the types of government. The types of authority are:
hierarchical and coordinate. Id. at 97-178. The two types of states are: reactive and
activist. Id. at 181-231. The two types of authority and government can intertwine
and create different types of legal proceedings. My paper could be read as
empirical and comparative evidence that the classical dichotomy is insufficient to
truly describe and understand the dynamics of legal design and judicial reform,
such as Damaksa suggests. In that sense, it would fit within his theoretical claim.
However, it is not my intention to use his framework to understand legal reforms
in Latin America, although the implications of such an undertaking would be
extremely relevant. The point of my paper is precisely to steer away from
theoretical abstractions of comparative criminal procedure, notwithstanding if
they fall or not within the classical dichotomy. My objective is to investigate the
reforms, based on the reforms themselves. This is, based on a careful analysis of
the new Codes and based on how local commentators actually construed the
reforms. I want to try to understand the reality of the reforms as such, rather than
to make them fit into pre-established scholarly and doctrinal categories, classical
(inquisitorial/adversarial) or revolutionary (hierarchical/coordinate/reactive/
activist based on structures of authority and forms of political government), as
may be the ones Damaska suggests. In that sense I intend my work to be a
concrete study of the reality of the reforms.
2 See Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 83, 117 (2010).
3 See Mdximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations:The Globalization of PleaBargainingand the Americanization Thesis in CriminalProcedure,
45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 18-19 (2004) (recognizing the difficulties of the abstract definitions of "adversarial" and "inquisitorial").
4 Julio B.J. Maier, 1B DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL ARGENTINO. FUNDAMENTOS [Penal Procedure Law. Foundations] 205-18 (Hammurabi, 2d ed. 1989) (Arg.).
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the XIII century, and France in the XIX century. Allegedly, France, as
a consequence of a liberal reform thrust brought by the ideals of the
revolution, adopted features of the adversarial model precisely because
of the articulation among accusatory and republican ideals.5 In "pure"
adversarial schemes of procedure, no general public authority or institution was in charge of prosecution. Instead, individuals were responsible for enforcement efforts. In some cases the victim of a crime
(private accuser), and in others, any person in representation of the
community (public accuser), could investigate and put on trial the offender of the law. 6
The inquisitorial system replaced Germanic Law and governed
most areas of continental Europe from the XIII century up until the
liberal revolutions of the XVIII century. In the inquisitorial model of
criminal justice, a centralized conception of power was fundamental.
In turn, a strong public administration of justice was organized hierarchically within the state and its power emanated from the state. The
individual had little value because the interests of the social order
were primary. 7
The French Revolution brought upon mixed systems, better
categorized as reformed versions of inquisitorial models in which some
elements of the adversary process were included. This supposedly
translated into proceedings with more delimited stages, public/oral trials, congruence between accusations, and sentences and more possibilities of superior judicial review.' The French Criminal Instruction
Code of 1808 accepted the basic principles of the inquisitorial rationale
but tried to implement elements from popular accusatory systems,
thus it may be properly characterized as a "reformed" inquisitorial
model. It had three basic stages: a preparatory instruction, a written/
secret investigation, and a public/oral trial.9 Tribunals were independent; the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions were divided
though they were part of the state globally speaking; and the primary
purpose was to seek the truth.1 °
Let's assume for a moment that there are in fact, at least in the
abstraction of theory, two structures of criminal procedure. Some
scholars have identified the definitive traits that allow us to distinguish adversarial and inquisitorial systems. Several authors have undertaken lengthy efforts to define each system and thus have produced
5 See id.

See id.
7 See id.
8 See id.
6

9 See Julio B.J. Maier, Exposici6n de Motivos, in
PROCESAL PENAL DE LA NACI6N 650 (1987) (Arg.).
10 Id.

EL PROYECTO DE C6DIGO
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important scholarly research on the topic. This paper does not have
the intention of attempting to produce new "definitions" of each criminal procedure category. Rather my aspiration is to test those
"definitions."
Several approaches have been used by the mainstream legal
scholar discourse to identify the "schemes" of adversarial and inquisitorial.1 1 Parallel to those approaches, some scholars consider that the
dualism of adversarial and inquisitorial "models" does not just refer to
normative structures but also to different methods of understanding
criminal procedure. 12 According to this "difference in understanding,"
adversarial systems are traditional under common law jurisdictions
and inquisitorial are typical under civil law jurisdictions.1 3 Academic
scholars in comparative criminal procedure have explained that the
Anglo-American system is usually referred to as an "adversarial"
model, whereas civil law jurisdictions in Europe and Latin America
have had systems categorized as inquisitorial.
We can attempt to summarize the distinguishing traits of the
adversarial and inquisitorial theoretical categories-normative-and
with respect to the "meaning and understanding" of criminal
procedure: 1 4
- Inquisitorial:
A) The meaning of the term "inquisitorial" has to do with extensive
and secret pre-trial investigations, reflecting official inquiries
rather than disputes. 5 "Basic to the inquisitorial system as it
exists today in 'civil law' countries is that its processes cannot
be aborted by the accused's 'guilty' plea. Even if the accused
does admit guilt, the inquiry must continue through a formal
trial to decide the proper application of the law to the facts. A
formal trial is also necessary to decide what punishment, if any,
or rehabilitation steps are needed."1" (footnotes omitted). A del See Langer, supra note 3, at 7-8 (explaining the approaches with which scholars
have tried to define "inquisitorial" and "adversarial').
12 See id. at 9 ("The adversarial and the inquisitorial models are not only two ways
to structure criminal proceedings, but also two ways of understanding and representing criminal procedure."); see also id. at 10 ("In other words, the adversarial
and the inquisitorial can be understood as two different structures of interpretation and meaning through which the actors of a given criminal justice system understand both criminal procedure and their role within the system.") (Footnotes
omitted) (Emphasis in the original).
13 See id. at 16.
14 See McLeod, supra note 2, at 116-17.
15 See Steven E. Hendrix, Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America:
Guatemala's Conversion to the Adversarial System, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 365,
389-90 (1998).
16 Id. at 390.
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fendant cannot end the phase of determination of guilt by admitting his responsibility before the court. Admission of guilta confession-is only an element of proof, and thus, does not
preclude litigation, so pleas of guilt do not fit in the system.
Plea bargains do not exist either.
A complete written record of the proceedings is kept in the form
of a "dossier."17 The dossier, or file, is central in inquisitorial
systems. 18
Judges actively participate in the interrogation of witnesses.
The officer of the court will begin the interrogation of witnesses
because they belong to "the process." This means that witnesses
and pieces of evidence are not subject to control of the parties,
but rather, once they are admitted, are controlled by the
judge.1 9 For example, once admitted, a witness would have to
declare, if the Court so desires, even against the will of the
party who originally requested the Court to order the declaration of such witness. Therefore, judges are understood as investigators.2" Decision makers are usually professional judges and
there is more hierarchical control.2 1
The inquisitorial decision-maker has more procedural power.
The defense is comparatively less powerful. For example the defense has no power to do its own pre-trial investigation.2 2
Investigations are conducted by state officials in order to determine the truth. Prosecutors are understood as "impartial magistrates whose role is to investigate the truth."2 3

See id.

18 See Langer, supra note 3, at 14. Professor Langer explains at length the impor-

tance of the dossier in inquisitorial criminal proceedings. I claim that reliance on a
record of the proceedings is just as important in the United States. Records of
trials have to accurately show what takes place and preservation of the record is
imperative for appellate purposes. The difference is that U.S. "records" reflect procedural activity rather than evidentiary material (i.e., in a dossier a declaration of
a witness, is embodied as evidence in the transcript as such.) Another difference is
that, American records reflect occurrences at several hearings, whereas inquisitorial dossiers show the succession of every stage of the proceedings, stages that
generally do not take place orally. In any event, reliance on the record procedurally and substantively is fundamental in both systems.
19 See id. at 22.
20 See id. at 18-19.
21 See id. at 25-26.
22 See id. at 13.
23 Id. at 10.
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F)

-

Inquisitorial proceedings are written and secret, with no clear
divide of adjudicatory and investigative phases. Prosecution
and adjudication roles are not clearly divided. 24
G) The pretrial investigation consumes a lengthy amount of time
during which
the defendant will likely remain in pre-trial
2 5
detention.
H) Parties do not confront each other's case by crossexamination.2 6
I) There is no discretion since compulsory prosecution is the absolute rule (admitting no exceptions) and truth seeking is the primary function of the proceedings.
J) Among other distinctive features, authors assert that investigations are controlled by the police, that the rights of defendants
are restricted during the pre-trial phase, that there is no way of
terminating proceedings before going to trial, and that victims
and lay adjudicators do not play a large role in the
proceedings.25
Adversarial:
A)

B)
C)
D)

Judges are passive in the interrogation of witnesses. They are
"passive umpires" in the dispute between prosecution and defense. 29 Furthermore, decision-makers are usually juries.
Prosecutors are understood as parties in a "dispute with an interest at stake in the outcome of the procedure."3"
Defendants can plead guilty and bargain.3 1
Decision makers have less procedural power and the prosecution and defense comparatively have more.3 2

See Mdximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure:Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 Am.J. COMp. L. 617, 621 (2007).
25 See James L. Bischoff, Reforming the Criminal Procedure System in Latin
America, 9 Tax. Hisp. J. L. & POL'Y 27, 35-42 (2003); Hendrix, supra note 15, at
392.
26 See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 40-41.
27 See Maier, supra note 4, at 205-218.
28 See Langer, supra note 3, at 18-22; Bischoff, supra note 25, at 25-42.
29 Langer, supra note 3, at 10-13 (explaining that judges in adversarial systems
are passive umpires). I will contest this notion because in bench trials, judges in
the United States are considerably less passive and substantially more active, suggesting that their attitude during proceedings, has more to do with fear of exposing their opinions to the jury than with an "adversarial understanding of their
role."
30 Langer, supra note 3, at 10.
31 See id. at 39.
32 See id. at 13.
24
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There is no compulsory duty to keep a dossier
or "file" which
33
contains all elements with evidentiary value.
F) The prosecution and the defense conduct their own pre-trial investigations and present the evidence obtained to a passive decision maker. This evidence will usually have been disclosed
before trial. Parties decide what evidence to present, which witnesses to bring, and in what order. Thus, parties are equal
adversaries. 3 4
G) Among other distinctive features, authors assert that in adversarial schemes of procedure there is less hierarchical control,
proceedings are public and oral, adjudicatory and investigative
functions are clearly divided, roles are clearly divided among
the prosecutor, the defendant and the adjudicator, parties may
terminate proceedings without going to trial, defendants are
awarded broad rights at every stage, and there is more victim
35
intervention in the proceedings.
We can see then that scholarly research shows two distinct categories of criminal procedure systems-models/schemes-that, at
least at a theoretical level, appear to have a fixed set of features.
Where is Latin America? As part of a civil law continental European
tradition, Latin America has traditionally been governed by inquisitorial systems. A great deal of literature has been spent in trying to define what is adversarial and what is inquisitorial. That is not the
purpose of this text. I do not aspire to find that definitive feature that
allows us to distinguish a truly adversarial system. This paper wants
to argue the paradox, or rather, the impossibility of attempting to define these categories. I will approach this task going to the text of the
Codes passed in Latin America over the last two decades. I plan to
focus on the reforms themselves, and on what legislatively was understood by each country that made part of the adversarial reform movement "adversarial." My hope is that by focusing on what actually and
legally was understood by each jurisdiction as "adversarial reform," we
will be able to better grasp, not the theoretical features of said category or model, but the true and real shared concerns of the reforms. Is
there anything in common among them? Is there a common concern in
the reforms as a consequence of which we can dare call of them "adversarial"? My claim is that we should let legislative reality teach us, if
there is anything we can call "adversarial" among the reforms, and
thus, if there is any issue we can identify as a common trait, concern,
or feature in the adversarial Latin American movement. Maybe then
33 See id. at 14.

See id. at 20-21.
35 See Langer, supra note 24, at 621; Maier, supra note 4, at 205-218.
34
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we will be able to better understand this process that Latin America
has undertaken in the last two decades.
With respect to the inquisitorial/adversarial dichotomy, and
more precisely, with respect to the essential ideals of the adversary
process, a brief reference to the United States Supreme Court may be
useful. One could not consider Supreme Court opinions strictly as "academic literature" since, notwithstanding their academic importance,
they are not law journal articles. Nonetheless, certain passages in
some cases are valuable for observing what is understood-by a high
court in an adversarial system-as "typical adversarial features." It is
intellectually provocative to observe when and how the Supreme Court
includes references to the "nature of the adversary process." This, of
course, is not an exhaustive analysis of how the Supreme Court understands the adversary process, but merely a superficial selection of
cases in which it has considered some traits as inherent to the adversarial model.
The Supreme Court has usually referred to the inquisitorial/
adversarial dichotomy when discussing two issues: effective assistance
of counsel and the right against compelled self-incrimination. The
Court has repeatedly held that the adversary process demands strong
and effective defense counsel to test the prosecution's case. Lack of effective counsel renders the process unreliable.3 6 Likewise, the Court
has held that a main characteristic of the accusatorial model-in opposition to the inquisitorial scheme of procedure-is that defendants
cannot be compelled to testify. The prosecution, thus, must prove its
case without relying on any activity by the defendant.3 7
However, in some cases regarding discovery the Court has considered that sufficient pretrial disclosure of evidence between parties
can reduce the perception of the justice system as a "sporting contest."
Consequently, the presentation of each party's case is fairer. The
Court even stated that the adversary process could not function without some sort of discovery rules.38 In conclusion, among the primary
typical characteristics and definitive traits of the adversary systemaccording to the United States Supreme Court-we can find the right
to effective assistance of counsel, the protection of the privilege against
36 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); see also Brewer v. Wil-

liams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
37 See Morris Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in
Europe and America, 48 HARv. L. REV. 433, 457-58, 467-73 (1935); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 589 (1976);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New
York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
38 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
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compelled self-incrimination, and rules that regulate some sort of pretrial discovery.
1.2. Was there an Adversarial Reform Movement in Latin America?
If so, what was it about?
It is fair to say there is a unanimous consensus with respect to
the following assertion: Latin America has historically been, and in
fact was until the reform era, governed by inquisitorial criminal procedure models. It is also commonly agreed that over the past two decades
Latin America has endured a Reform Movement. This Reform Movement caused jurisdictions to modify their criminal procedure laws in
order to adopt adversarial schemes of investigation and adjudication,
thus, leaving behind the inquisitional tradition.
I propose to take a look at the mainstream discourse surrounding the Reform Era.3 9 I can summarize this discourse in the following
statement: several jurisdictions in Latin America over the past decades modified their Criminal Procedure codes in order to leave behind
inquisitorial models and adopt adversarial schemes or structures.4 ° In
the following pages we will explore a good deal of the comments that
have surrounded the reform. I will call this the "official and mainstream discourse" about the Reform. A discourse issued, constructed,
and fed by academia, international organizations, and reformers
themselves.
According to the official mainstream discourse about the Reform Movement, Spain and Portugal introduced inquisitorial systems
in Latin America during colonial times. The features of this model
Latin America "inherited" include a bureaucratic judicial organization,
with vertical and centralized powers, no real judicial independence,
with written, secret, judicial investigations conducted by a public officer that concentrated investigatory and adjudicatory functions, burdened with the duty of finding the truth, and no oral/public trials.
39 See Alberto Binder, Pr6logo, in REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMI9RICA
LATINA: RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO

[Criminal Procedure Reforms

in Latin America: Results of the Observation Project] 11, 11-19 (2005) (Centro de
Estudios de Justicia de las Am6ricas, 2005) available at http://www.cejamericas.
org/index.php/bibliotecalbiblioteca-virtual/doc download/5271-reformasprocesales-penales-en-am%C3%A9rica-latina-resultados-del-proyectos-deseguimiento-only-spanish.html (exalting the importance of oral proceedings and
the challenges of its implementation and problems that are appearing in practice).
40

See Cristian Riego, Presentation,in REFORMAS DE LA JUSTICA EN AMIARICA LAINNOVACION [Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Exper-

TINA: EXPERIENCIAS DE

iences of Innovation] 7 (Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Am~rcas, 2010),
available at http://www.cejamericas.org/index.php/biblioteca/biblioteca-virtual/
doc download/5383-reformas-de-la-justicia-en-am%C3%A9rica-latina.html.
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Additionally, written files or dossiers of the proceedings had to be
mandatorily kept.4 1
Following this discourse, several countries in Latin America
and Continental Europe (commonly referred to as part of a historical
"civil law" tradition) have recently tried to move towards the adversarial model of criminal investigation and adjudication.4 2 One trend of
this movement has been to attribute a passive role to the fact-finder/
decision maker, while giving more procedural influence to the prosecution and the defense. This influence refers to investigative powers, and
the authority to freely find, select, and present the evidence of their
choice. This of course includes a preference for cross-examination as
the quintessential adversarial method for introducing testimonial evidence.4 3 Basically, the reforms allegedly attempted to make trial the
central stage in the proceedings and the prosecution/defense dispute
the essential trait of the system. Reducing procedural delays, and thus
creating a more effective system, was also a main concern in the
region.4 4
Countries in this Reform Movement have also opted for softening compulsory prosecution. Compulsory prosecution is a typical trait
of inquisitorial systems.4 5 Following the official discourse about the
Reforms, other legislative options to transform criminal procedure
models include the introduction of juries, the adoption of oral techniques of case management, and mechanisms that allow termination
of the proceedings before trial, such as plea bargaining, or at least,
4 6
instruments which resemble or are inspired by plea bargains.
41

See LAs REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMtRICA LATINA [The Penal Proce-

dure Reforms in Latin America] 19, 22 (Julio B.J. Maier et al. eds. 2000) (Arg.).
42 Jos6 1. Cafferata Nores, La Reforma Procesal en Am&ica Latina [The Procedural Reform in Latin America] 11-28 (last visited April 15, 2013), http://enj.org/portal/biblioteca/penal/derecho-procesal-penal/19.pdf (analyzing what has changed
with the reforms and what should keep changing within Courts, the Public Ministry, etc. Also listing paradigmatic features of the reforms; the opportunity principle heads the list. Among other universal features of the reforms, Professor
Cafferata also includes victims, the defendants, the courts, the Public Ministry,
reparation to victims); see also id. at 11 (evaluating the reforms). Professor Cafferata lists as universal traits of the reforms abstract rights included in the new
Codes. I claim that the only truly operational and practical trait is the opportunity
principle.
43 See Langer, supra note 3, at 27.
44 See Linn Hammergren, Fifteen Years Of Judicial Reform in Latin America:
Where We Are And Why We Haven't Made More Progress, 4-5, ftp://pogar.org/Local
User/pogarp/judiciary/linn2/latin.pdf (last visited February 7, 2013).
45 See Langer, supra note 3, at 28.
46 See id.
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The adversarial reforms in the region can be summarized in
the aspiration of leaving behind secret, written, and judicial investigations, in exchange for public/oral trials in front of impartial fact-finders, where parties have the opportunity of actively and directly
confronting opposing counsel's evidence and witnesses.4 7 It has also
been argued that the reformed Codes intended to heighten respect for
human rights and democratic values.48
It is also a matter of consensus among commentators within
the mainstream discourse that the United States directly influenced
the Reform Movement in Latin America. In fact, U.S. advisors worked
closely with Latin American counterparts in the late 1980s and early
1990s to redact the new Codes.4 9 The U.S. channeled support mainly
through the United States Agency for International Development's
(USAID) criminal justice reform projects.50
The Reform Movement's main leader was Professor Binder
from Argentina, and the C6rdoba Province Criminal Procedure Code
(1938-1940) and the Criminal Procedure Code of Costa Rica (1973)
provided normative inspiration (Argentina is a Federal nation and
C6rdoba is one of its provinces). Some commentators suggest that the
procedural model adopted in C6rdoba with the 1939 Code was advertised as a "mix." In reality, it imported elements from the Italian, German, and Spanish Codes, which the Napoleonic French Code had
influenced. Thus, it was in fact still inquisitorial. Calling the C6rdoba

47 See Riego, supra note 40, at 7-10.
48 See LAS REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES, supra note 41, at 26 (explaining that

part of the reason for the reforms was overcoming dictatorships and the consequent entry to democratic governments); UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE TEMUCO,
SEMINARIO REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL 23 - 27 (2001) [hereinafter SEMINARIO
REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL] (Chile) (holding that part of the reason for reform

movements after the 1980s was democratization); id. at 26 (explaining that within
the agenda for development in Latin America, criminal justice reform began to
play an important role); see Fernando Carrillo Fl6rez, Los Retos de la Reforma de
la Justicia en Amdrica Latina [The Challenges of Justice Reform in Latin
America] 29-42. Mister Carrillo was at the time he wrote the cited article an InterAmerican Development Bank, specialist for Rule of Law. He held that consolidation of the Rule of Law and democratic government is necessary for economic development, which in turn made judicial reforms necessary.
'9 See Hammergren, supra note 44, at 4-5.
50 See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 40-50 (explaining that the reforms redefined the
roles of judges and prosecutors). The reforms also resulted in better funded and
organized public defender services, abbreviated proceedings, discretion, and limits
in incarceration. The reforms have been accompanied by training programs.) See
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Code a "mixed system" does not do justice to the fact that it was actually strongly inquisitorial. 5
Nonetheless, according to the official discourse, the Code that
enlightened and influenced the adversarial Reform Movement was the
Criminal Procedure Code of C6rdoba. This Code represented, according to some commentators, the "reception" of criminal procedure law in
continental Europe at the time, which had displaced the classical inquisitorial features. Thus, the main normative sources of influence for
C6rdoba were the German Criminal Procedure Code of 1875, the Italian Criminal Procedure Codes of 1911 and 1930,, and the Spanish
Criminal Procedure Code of 1882. Other major sources of influence
over the Reform Movement were the draft of the Federal Criminal Procedure Code of Argentina (1986)-though it was never passed-and
the Model Criminal Procedure Code for Ibero-America. 52 Allegedly,
the "prestige" of the Model Code allowed several jurisdictions in the
Reforms to use it. 53 These included Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, among others.5 4
Some reforms have not been fully well received because there
is a tendency in some jurisdictions to perpetuate old power structures
implicit to the inquisitorial model.5 ' Additionally, the reforms face a
See Walter Richard Trinchari, El Rol del Juez Chileno en el Nuevo C6digo
Procesal Penal, in SEMINARIO REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 48, at 23-27
51

(explaining that the mix system was adopted in Argentina in 1938 in the C6rdoba
Province. It was imported from the 1913 Italian Code, which, in turn, was inspired
by the Napoleon Code. The author holds that even though it is called a mixed
system, it does not in fact replace the basis of the inquisitorial model.).
52 See LAS REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES, supra note 41, at 26 (explaining
that
the Argentina Criminal Procedure Code Draft inspired the Ibero-American Model
Criminal Procedure Code).
53 See Kai Ambos & Jan Woischnik, Las Reformas Procesalesen Amdrica Latin, in
LAS REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES,

supra note 41, at 835-96 (explaining that the

Model Code was strongly influential and the cornerstone of the reform movement.
However, the authors concede legislative results in several jurisdictions have
taken some distance from the Model rules.).
54 See LAS REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES, supra note 41, at 26-29 (explaining
that other jurisdictions in the region used the Model Code because of its prestige).
55 See Cafferata, supra note 42, at 12-15 (explaining that even though each reform
was led locally, international support was provided. He also claims that the C6rdoba Code and the Costa Rica 1973 Code, both with a mixed system of public/oral
trials, were very influential in the reform movement. Additionally, he asserts that
the goal of the reform was - or should have been - to create systems which respect
human rights. Until the time when he wrote this paper, El Salvador, Venezuela,
Guatemala, C6rdoba, and Buenos Aires had already adopted such a system. According to him, Professor Binder was the leader of the reform movement in the
region. The reforms intended to leave behind jurisdictional, written, and secret
investigations, as well as adopt contradictory trials in the direct presence of the
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number of challenges for their adequate implementation.5 " It is also
important to remember that the reforms have been (and are still) supplemented with intensive training and financial support from international organizations and U.S. agencies. The Departments of State and
Justice established programs such as the Offices of Overseas
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA), and the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), and
they continue to assist the adversarial criminal procedure reforms initially supported by USAID. 5 7
In sum, according to the mainstream discourse, a "wave" of
criminal procedure reforms has covered Latin America. The Reform
Movement brought revolutionary changes to the antiquated criminal
justice structures of investigation and adjudication.5" The new Codes
supposedly embody an accusatorial conception of litigation, following
the trend set by other civil law jurisdictions in Europe (e.g., Spain,
Italy and Portugal). 9 Thus, a uniform procedural reform has occurred,
producing "considerable similarity" among the new Codes in the region. This is because all of the new pieces of legislation share a common influence epicenter: the Model Criminal Procedure Code for IberoAmerica (inspired itself by the Cordoba Criminal Procedure Code).
These Codes "emphasized" the introduction of oral proceedings, procedural efficiency, short periods of pre-trial detention, and more guarantees for the defendant. This emphasis allegedly shifted power and
discretion from judges to prosecutors while it simultaneously created
stronger, well organized, and efficient public defender services. Therefore, the roles of the parties involved in criminal litigation were redefined. ° This shift of power meant that with the Reforms, the use of
prosecutorial discretion and abbreviated proceedings was permissible.6 1 The Reform Movement introduced to the region "new traits," in-

fact-finder, where parties are equals. He points out that victim's rights have been
a central issue for the movement. The reforms have demanded democratic influence and a political will to design criminal policy, but countries have shown a resistance under which old judicial power structures are perpetuated.).
56 See Kai Ambos & Jan Woischnik, supra note 53, at 835-96 (listing among the
future problems of criminal justice systems in the region: increasing crime rates,
new forms of criminality, and new forms of investigation).
57 See McLeod, supra note 2, at 122-23.
'8 See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 34.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 42-44, 46-47.

82 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:1
cluding alternative dispute resolution methods, private prosecutorial
actions, and guilty pleas.6 2
In conclusion, it is safe to say that there is a universal conception among commentators who have analyzed the legal developments
in Latin America over the past two decades that the region did in fact
have a Reform Movement. That movement brought, as a consequence,
the introduction of adversarial criminal procedure systems, while leaving behind inquisitorial structures.
1.3.

General history of the Reform Movement

Latin America's criminal procedure historical tradition has developed from Spanish legacy.6 3 When nations in the region achieved
independence, they chose to maintain the criminal procedure scheme
they had inherited from Spain.6 4 Thereinafter, Latin American countries drifted away from the reforms that took place in Europe over the
19th century.6 5
The new and independent nations in the region modeled their
procedural structures after European codifications such as the Spanish Code of 1822.66 While Europe and Latin America shared a common
understanding of substantive criminal law throughout the 19th and
20th centuries, Latin American jurisdictions adamantly held on to
traditional inquisitorial systems. 6 7 In comparison, European legislations experienced strong procedural reform efforts-influenced by the
Napoleonic Code-during those centuries. 68 When some of the countries in Latin America reformed their Codes over the 19th and 20th
centuries, they allegedly adopted a "mix" of inquisitorial and adversarial features.6 9 Nonetheless,
Latin American systems in practice afforded the accusatory elements very little relevance. The region stayed
bound to the pure inquisitorial system in a form almost
identical to that formerly employed by the colonial administrations. Astonishingly, Latin America preserved
this structure almost entirely for another century and a
half until a wave of reforms began a decade ago, resultSee Hendrix, supra note 15, at 389-90, 397-400 (pointing out that discretion,
guilty pleas and other alternative dispute resolution methods like private prosecution appear as new traits in the reforms).
63 See Langer, supra note 24, at 627.
64 See id. at 628
65 See id.
66 See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 34.
67 See id.
68 See Langer, supra note 24, at 627.
69 See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 34.
62
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ing in nearly five hundred years without any meaningful
criminal procedural reform (in spite of reforms in other
areas of the law).7 °
The Napoleon Code of 1808, while following the inquisitorial
tradition in Continental Europe, adopted elements such as oral/public
trials from the criminal procedure structure in the United Kingdom.
However, its essence-written and secret investigations with few
rights for the defendant-pervaded. Some described the Napoleon
Code of Criminal Instruction as a "mixed model," since it included features and traits from the inquisitorial scheme in its pre-trial phase,
and from the adversarial system during trial.7 1 The French Criminal
Procedure Code spread throughout Continental Europe. 7 2 This legal
phenomenon did not go unnoticed in Latin America. Nevertheless, reform efforts in the European direction were rejected. 73 Therefore,
Latin American jurisdictions upheld legislations that closely mimicked
the typical inquisitorial model inherited from colonial times.
Even though several Latin American political actors advocated adopting one of these mixed models, most
countries in the region ultimately rejected them. Latin
American elites rejected the more liberal codes mainly
because they deeply distrusted and disliked the jury as
well as oral and public trials, believing that their populations were not ready for them. Instead, the criminal procedures that the young, independent Latin American
republics adopted generally followed the inquisitorial
model (created by the Catholic Church and absolutist
monarchies) that had prevailed in continental Europe
and the Portuguese and Spanish Americas between the
13th and 19th centuries. The new codes deviated from
the original inquisitorial codes by refusing to authorize
torture to obtain confessions and by limiting the system
of legal proofs. Nevertheless, the main features of a typical Latin American criminal procedure code followed the
inquisitorial model.7 "
Among the main traits of the governing criminal procedure
structure in Latin America over the 19th and 20th centuries one can
identify, among others, are the absence of prosecutorial discretion, the
secret nature of the proceedings, the lack of division of roles and functions among the actors involved, and the requirement of written files
Id.
See Langer, supra note 24, at 627.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 628.
74 Id.
70
71
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or dossiers.7 5 Therefore, the adjudication phase was still inquisitorial
in nature, since it was written, it was secret, and it occurred before a
professional judge with no intervention of lay fact-finders. Before the
Reform Era, Latin American legislations embraced inquisitorial
schemes with these features.7 6 As one author notes, "[a]ll of this
changed, however, during the last fifteen years, as fourteen Latin
American countries as well as numerous Latin American province and
state jurisdictions replaced their inquisitorial codes with accusatorial
77
ones."
The Reform's causes overlap and are diverse in nature. Authors argue that explanations for the Reform Movement include the
transition of various governments in the region to democracy, the interest of the international community, and a messianic aspiration that
new Codes were needed to solve all judicial problems.7" The history of
the reforms requires a necessary reference to the Ibero-American Institute of Procedural Law. 79 The Institute was created in 1957.80 Its
first president, Niceto Alcald Zamora y Castillo, was the first to put
forward the idea that the Institute should issue a Model Criminal Procedure Code."' He believed that the base for this Model Code should be
the Criminal Procedure Code of C6rdoba. s2 The Institute advocated for
a "Model" Code with the hope it would integrate the region. s3
In 1937 a "commission" was set up to draft the C6rdoba Code,
and the members of this commission were Professors Soler and
V6lez. s4 The Code was passed in 1939.85 The Italian Criminal Proce86
dure Codes of 1911 and 1930 directly influenced the C6rdoba Code.
The Criminal Procedure Codes of Spain (1882) and Germany (1875)
also served as sources of inspiration for C6rdoba.
Notwithstanding
those external normative influences, Professors V6lez and Mariconde
did not just "copy" foreign legislations, they adjusted the rules to fit
75 See id. at 629-30.
76 See Langer, supra note 24, at 629-30.
77 Id. at 631.
78 See id. at 632-33.
79

See id. at 642

80 See id.
81
82

See id.
See Langer, supra note 24, at 642.

83 See id. at 642-43.
84 See id. at 634
85 See id. at 635
86 See id. at 634
87 Julio B J Maier, Introducci6n:HistoriaBreve del C6digo Procesal Penal Modelo
para Iberoamdrica,in C6digo Procesal Penal Para Iberomdrica 9 (Rijeka ed. 2005),
http://www.pravri.uniri.hr/hr/zavodi/zkzm/documents/Iberijski-Zakonik.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2013).
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their own reality."8 Some suggest this Code had many "accusatorial
aspects," such as public/oral trials and more rights for the defendant in
the pre-trial phase.8 9 Nevertheless, several inquisitorial traits survived in the Code, such as a lack of juries, written, and secret proceedings, an absence of prosecutorial discretion, and a use of judges as
instructors for serious felonies (only minor offenses had prosecutors in
charge of the investigation).9 0
Afterwards, Costa Rica adopted a new Criminal Procedure
Code in 1973.91 It based the reform on C6rdoba's Code, and Professor
V6lez participated in the drafting.9 2 Allegedly, due to the presence of
military dictatorships and a general lack of interest in judicial reform,
the C6rdoba Code did not expand beyond Costa Rica.9 3
Between 1967 and 1978 the Institute undertook the necessary
work to draft the Model Code. 9 4 Ultimately, a commission was selected
to redraft the text.9" Professor Julio Maier, an Argentinian lawyer and
scholar, was part of that commission. 96 As we will see, his efforts have
been decisive in the history of the reform movement. In 1988 during
the 11th Conference of the Institute, Professor Maier presented the
Model Criminal Procedure Code for Ibero-America. 9 7 The Institute approved the Code.98 Primarily, C6rdoba's Code of 1939 and the German
Criminal Procedure Code inspired the commission.9 9 Professor Maier
admits the most outstanding achievement
of the Code was to leave be100
hind the inquisitorial tradition.
Meanwhile, Professor Maier also led procedural reform efforts
in Argentina.1" 1 Those efforts culminated in the 1986 Federal Procedure Code Draft.'0 2 Unfortunately, the Draft failed to gain approval
from the legislature, and was never enacted. 10 3 The 1986 Draft has a
88
89

See Langer, supra note 24, at 634.
See id. at 634.

90 See id. at 634-36; see Binder, supra note 39, at 50-58.

91 See Langer, supra note 24, at 636.
92

See id.

93 See Langer, supra note 24, at 636.
94 See Maier, supra note 87, at 11.
95 See Langer, supra note 24, at 642.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 643.
98 See id. at 642-43.

99 See id. at 642 (abbreviating the German Code of Criminal Procedure as
"StPO").
1oo See Maier, supra note 87, at 18.
101 See Langer, supra note 24, at 637.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 641.
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close connection with the rest of the reforms in the region. 10 4 The
Model Code of 1988 followed the general features included in the 1986
Draft. °5 Some variations were incorporated regarding the possibility
victims and non-profit organizations to serve as private prosecutors in
some cases, and the adoption of lay juries or "mixed"
adjudicatory bod10 6
ies with professional and lay decision makers.
Simultaneously, Guatemala hired Professors Maier and Binder
to draft its Criminal Procedure Code. 10 7 They recommended and redacted an accusatorial code.'0 8 The professors presented a project influenced by the Model Code and the 1986 Draft. 10 9 After the ordinary
legislative process, Congress passed the new Criminal Procedure Code
in 1992.110 It came into effect in 1994.1" After
Guatemala, more than
1 12
a dozen criminal procedure reforms followed.
Which countries do commentators include as being part of the
Reform Movement? Which reforms are catalogued as adversarial? Notwithstanding the consensus on the fact that a Reform Movement existed and that it intended to replace inquisitorial Codes with
adversarial models, there is no consensus regarding which legislations
became "truly" accusatory. Commentators differ. Based on their own
lists of adversarial "attributes," lists that generally tend to be homogeneous, they conclude that some countries deserve to be considered adversarial. 1 1 3 Paradoxically, though different commentators claim more
See
See
106 See
107 See
108 See
109 See
110 See
1' See
104

'05

112

id. at 643.
id.
id.
Maier, supra note 87, at 18
Langer, supra note 24, at 643.
id. at 646.
id.
id.
See, Informe Costa Rica, in REFORMAS

PROCESALES PENALES EN AMI]RICA LA-

TINA: RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO,

supra note 39, at 64; Informe

Bolivia, in REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMIRICA LATINA: RESULTADOS DEL
PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 39, at 173; and Informe El Salvador, in
REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMItRICA LATINA: RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO

supra note 39, at 385.
Compare Bischoff, supra note 25, at 34; with Kai Ambos & Jan Woischnik,
supra note 53, at 870-872 (According to Ambos and Woischnik, Costa Rica and
Guatemala had the first reforms. Until the time when they wrote their paper, if
passed, Codes in Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela would also be
construed as "adversarial" or respectful of the Rule of Law. According to them,
Codes in Cuba, Uruguay, Mexico and Peru had not yet entered the Reform Movements. Argentina was "half-way" and Brazil, El Salvador and Colombia, had only
timid reforms. Finally, in their opinion, only Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Panami,
Venezuela, Costa Rica and Guatemala in their Codes or approved reforms, deserved a "positive evaluation."), and Cafferata, supra note 42. (Includes as part of
DE SEGUIMIENTO,

113
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or less the same features to be typically "adversarial," not all of them
include the same jurisdictions within the Reform Movement. Therefore
this paper will include as part of the Reform Movement any Latin
American country that has been construed to have experienced an adversarial reform, even if there is no consensus about it among
commentators.
Hence, the list of countries that are part of the adversarial Reform Movement includes: 1. Argentina; 2. Guatemala; 3. Paraguay; 4.
Bolivia; 5. Ecuador; 6. Peri; 7. Panama; 8. Colombia; 9. El Salvador;
10. Chile; 11. Costa Rica; 12. Venezuela; 13. Honduras; 14. Dominican
Republic; and 15. Mexico.
There are some methodological difficulties with Mexico and Argentina. Since they are federal nations, the research for this paper
would extend infinitely if we were to include all their states or provinces within the Movement. There is also a problematic issue worth
noting about Ecuador.
Mexico reformed its Constitution in 2008. The amendment established the constitutional basis for adversarial reform at the federal
and state levels. 114 Legislators at every level have until 2016 to adopt

the Reform Movement: El Salvador; Venezuela, Paraguay, Guatemala, C6rdoba
and Buenos Aires). Compare, Hendrix, supra note 15, at 292 n. 189 ("Bolivia,
Panama, Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Argentina have all made
moves to reform their Criminal Procedure frameworks. However, none go as far as
Guatemala in creating a true adversarial system. For example, "oral trials" in
Panama, Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru did not mean doing away with the written collection of evidence in the summary. In those countries, the files are read
aloud now. On very rare occasions there might be a witness. However, the process
remains much as ever under the old jueces de instrucci6n. Similarly in Argentina,
there is a so-called "mixed-modern" system combining the old sumario with some
oral elements, not an adversarial system.") (Citations omitted); with Langer,
supra note 3 at 27-28. (Professor Langer includes within the Reform Movement:
Venezuela (1998), Peri (2004), Paraguay (1998), Nicaragua (2001), Honduras
(1999), Guatemala (1992), El Salvador (1997), Ecuador (2000), Dominican Republic (2002), Costa Rica (1996), Colombia (2004), Chile (2000), Bolivia (1999), Argentina Federal (1991) (and some Argentinian provinces such as C6rdoba (1992) and
Buenos Aires (1997)), Mexico (at least in some States like Oaxaca y Chihuahua
(2006))); and Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Americas CEJA, Reformas
Procesales Penales en Amrica Latina: Resultados del Proyecto de Seguimiento,
IV Etapa 14 (coord. Cristian Riego R. 2007) (includes among the reform movement: Argentina/ Province of C6rdoba (1998), Bolivia (2000), Chile (2000), Colombia (2005), Costa Rica (1998), Ecuador (2001), El Salvador (1998), Guatemala
(1994), Honduras (2002), Nicaragua (2001), Paraguay (1999), Rep6blica Dominicana (2004), Venezuela (1999))
114 CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43001, SUPPORTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM IN MEXICO: THE U.S. ROLE 4 (2013).
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and implement accusatory Codes. 1 15 Commentators suggest some
states had important criminal procedure reforms before 2008, reforms
that could even be catalogued as adversarial." 6 After the constitutional reform, several legislations replaced (or are in the way of replacing) their old inquisitorial codes with adversarial schemes of
procedure. 11 7 Furthermore, the National Commission of Superior
Courts of the United Mexican States issued a "Model Criminal Procedure Code," as a parameter for future legal reforms after the
amendments.""
I choose to work only with the Mexican constitutional reform
itself, and the rules provided thereof, regarding criminal procedure.
Including only some of the states' reformed adversarial codes within
the Reform Movement would be arbitrary. Given that federal as well
as state legislations (even if they had significant procedural reforms
before 2008) have to adapt to the newly established constitutional
standards of criminal procedure, it seems reasonable to only include as
part of the Reform Movement, at least for the purposes of this paper,
the text of the Mexican constitution itself." 9
The Mexican Constitution allows us to analyze only at a very
superficial level what the accusatory process in Mexico will look like.
The Constitution only mandates the minimum foundations for future
legislation, so in no way does it let us rigorously grasp the results of
adversarial reform in Mexico. According to the minimums set forth by
the Constitution, any future legislation should: safeguard basic procedural guarantees common to human rights in America and other sysConstituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
116 See Comisi6n Nacional de Tribunales Superiores de Justicia de los Estados
115

Unidos Mexicanos CONATRIB, in INTRODUCTION

TO CODIGO MODELO DEL PROCESO
PENAL AcUSATORIO PARA LOS ESTADOS DE LA FEDERACION 4-5, available at http:/!

www.pjedomex.gob.mx/web2/documentos/CodModProPenAcu(Conatrib).pdf (last
visited April 17, 2013).
117 See C6digo Federal De Procedimientos Penales [CFPP] [Federal Criminal
Procedure Code], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 3 de Mayo de 2013
(Mex.) (Several recent decrees have altered sections of this code); see also,
Secretaria de Servicios Parlamentarios, C6digo Federal de Procedimientos
Penales: Decreteos de Refoma, LXII LEGISLATURA (Last modified May 3, 2013),
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cfpp.htm.
118 See Comisi6n Nacional de Tribunales Superiores de Justicia de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos 12, available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/
rev/refud/cont/8/doc/docl5.pdf.
119 Of the pre-constitutional reform "adversarial" States (Oaxaca, Nuevo M6xico,
Nuevo Le6n, Chihuahua) it seems only Chihuahua had prosecutorial discretion.
The Constitution implemented discretion. The new Code for the State of Mexico
also has discretion. The model Code and the Project for the Federal Criminal Procedure Code adopt discretion.
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tems in the region, guarantee the parties access to the proceedings
during the investigative phase, adopt public/oral trials with direct
presence of the fact-finder/decision maker, include rules about arrest,
pretrial detention and seizure of property, regulate the police as a supportive investigative force under the supervision of the prosecutorial
body, allow victims to participate in the proceedings, and permit private prosecution for certain offenses.1 2 °
As explained supra Argentina has been a central force in the
Reform Movement. In fact, commentators suggest unanimously that
the 1986 Draft was the first adversarial reform effort in Latin
America. I choose to use the Draft-in representation of Argentinaas part of the Reform Movement. Even though that exact draft was not
approved, commentators hold that it heavily influenced future criminal procedure reforms in Argentina's federal and state levels. Ecuador
is a very particular example of the Reform Movement in Latin
America. Ecuador replaced its criminal justice system with an adversarial model. The new Code has been in effect since 2001.121 The Code
has been criticized because some of its rules, still rooted within inquisitorial rationale, openly contradict
the oral proceedings that are inher122
ent to accusatory systems.
Among other elements that set Ecuador apart from the rest of
the region, one can mention that it is the only jurisdiction in which
prosecutorial discretion was not introduced immediately with the reform, but instead, several years later.1 2 3 The opportunity principle
was created in the 2008 Constitution and was included in the Code
until 2009. 124 Therefore, elements of the adversary process have been
slowly making their way into Ecuadorian criminal procedure law. In
any event, Ecuador--today can be considered as one of the countries
involved in the Reform Movement. However, for the purposes of this
paper, and given Ecuador's peculiarities, in order to completely replace
the old inquisitorial model, it will not be included in any further analysis. It is impossible to pinpoint the exact moment over the past decade
when the Code actually became adversarial. Hence, it would be arbitrary to select for the inquiries that are to come in this paper, one verSee, Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
Title 1 Chap. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.)
(detailing the basic rights of Mexican citizens that cannot be abridged).
120

121

See generally, CODiGo DE

DURE]

122

PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCE-

(Ecu.)

See Informe Ecuador, in

REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMtWRICA LATINA:

RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO,
123

See

supra note 39, at 104-07.

CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION]

20 de Oc-

tubre de 2008, Sec. 10, art. 195 (Ecu)
124

See id; see

DURE.]

alsoCODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL [CODE OF

art. 33 (Ecu.).

CRIMINAL PROCE-
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sion of the Code that was in effect at any given point in time since
2001.
Notwithstanding the risk of over-generalizing, the particular
histories of the reforms in each country can be summarized as follows.
When one consults the available sources for each of the reformed jurisdictions, one can draw a fairly coherent map of the path of all the reforms. 125 Those sources include local scholars, governmental agents,
and reports from international organizations or NGOs. Nonetheless,
we must not forget that each nation has historical details and specificities that account for the political, legal, social, and economic climate
leading up to the reform.
The new Codes were charged with messianic aspirations.
Voices of renewal claimed that enactment of adversarial legislations
would solve (or least help solve to a considerable extent) all problems
in the criminal justice systems. Thus, the reforms were seen as "necessary." Reform efforts generally began in the region with local events or
forums where the convenience of the adversarial transformation was
discussed. Commissions were then appointed to draft the new
Codes.'12 In some instances, such commissions had the broader task of
assessing and suggesting modifications to the justice system in gen1 27
eral, not just criminal procedure legislation specifically.
Reforms sometimes encompassed the Constitution as well as
statutes, and the new Codes were not always immediately applied after approval. 12 8 Rather, a number of jurisdictions chose gradual or deferred mechanisms of implementation, while the particular country
125 Costa Rica (Code passed in 1998). See Informe Costa Rica, supra note 112, at

64. Venezuela (Code passed in 1999). See Informe Venezuela, in
PROCESALES

PENALES

EN

AME RICA

LATINA:

RESULTADOS

DEL

REFORMAS

PROYECTO

DE

supra note 39, at 127. El Salvador (Code passed in 1999). See Informe El Salvador, supra note 112, at 385. Bolivia (Code passed in 1999). See Informe Bolivia, supra note 112, at 173. Chile (Code passed in 2000). See Informe
SEGUIMIENTO,

Chile, in REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMERICA LATINA: RESULTADOS DEL
PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 39, at 33-43. Colombia (Code passed in
2005). See Informe Honduras, in REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMIPRICA LATINA: RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 39, at 181 - 185;

Informe Paraguay, in Reformas

PROCESALES

PENALES

EN AME RICA

LATINA:

RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 39, at 72. Mexico (Consti-

tutional amendment approved in 2008): see Langer, supra note 3; McLeod, supra
note 2, at 119-20; Paul J. Zwier & Alexander Barney, Moving to an Oral Adversarial System in Mexico: Jurisprudential,CriminalProcedure, Evidence Law, and
Trial Advocacy Implications 26 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 189 (2012).
126 See Informe El Salvador, in REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMI8RICA LATINA: RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO,
127 See id.

supra note 39, at 112

128 See SEELKE, supra note 114, at 4 (discussing the changes to the Mexican Constitution as part of the effort to reform criminal procedure).
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adapted its infrastructure-and even its culture-to the demands of
12 9
an adversarial system.
The reforms were generally read as "historical revolutionary
landmarks," resulting from ample debates and broad consensus. 130 Local commentators assert, in general, that pre-reform systems were
inefficient, lacked transparency and respect for human rights.13 No
jurisdiction prior to the reform allowed prosecutorial discretion. 3 2 The
reformed legislations on the other hand are generally valued as positive adversarial transformations, with public oral trials, clear division
of investigative and judicial functions and roles, impartial judges, efficient and transparent proceedings, and prosecutorial discretion. 133
The adversarial reforms are also advertised as means to respect
human rights international instruments and incorporate decisions
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.1 3 4
The new Codes, as stated by local commentators, were inspired
by one or several of the following normative instruments: the C6rdoba
Code, the Model Code, the German Criminal Procedure Code, and the
Italian Criminal Procedure Code.1 35 Local authors also cite as a source
of inspiration the preceding reformed Codes in the region. USAID
played a central role in the Reform Movement. 1-36 Therefore, replacing
inquisitorial codes became the essential mission of USAID in the region.' 3 7 Other international organizations also supported a number of
reform efforts in Latin America.
Implementation of the reforms has not been without challenges. Commentators agree that reform efforts have not been simple
and that transformations of criminal justice systems in the region
have not gone as expected.13 The region still has a long way to go
before fully embracing the premises and rationale of adversarial litigation. There is a consensus that for a system to truly function as adversarial, more than mere legislative reforms with abstract and non129

See Informe Ecuador, supra note 122, at 104; see also, Informe El Salvador,

supra note 112, at 112.
130 See Binder, supra note 39, at 12.
131 See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 37.
132

Id. at 44.

133
134

See Binder, supra note 39, at 19.
See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 50.

135

See id. at 42. See generally, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [Code of Criminal

Procedure], Feb. 1, 1877,

[BGBI] 1, as amended (Ger.);
[ Code of Criminal Procedure], 24 ottobre

BUNDESGESETZBLATT

CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.p.p.]

1988 (It.).
136 See McLeod, supra note 2, at 116.
137

Id.
138 See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 50-51; see also, Binder, supra note 39, at 19.
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transformative provisions are needed. 139 Lacking criticisms to normative design, the literature has focused on the administrative, operational, and cultural challenges posed by the reform.1 4 ° Therefore, if
accusatorial Codes demand changes in the way public institutions operate then, without adequate organizational, administrative, and cultural transformations, commentators have alerted about possible
failures of the reform movement. 14 1 Inappropriate legal design does
not seem to be a reason of concern. 142 Rather, attention for the success
of the reforms focused on infrastructure, culture, training of litigators
in the abilities demanded by an adversarial system, and administrative adaptation of already existent, or in some cases, newly created
institutions such as the Public Ministry, the Public Defender, the Police, 143 and Courthouses. 144 The relationship between prosecutors and
police forces, as well as supervision and management of police investigatory work, is also a troubling issue for commentators in the region.
1.4.

Preliminaryconclusions

Thus far we have analyzed the Reform Movement in Latin
America. But what have we really analyzed? We have analyzed literature from two types of commentators.
Since the beginning of the Reform Era a number of commentators have dealt with causes and consequences for the reforms. Once
each country added to the movement, local authors started publishing
about the reform. Therefore, within this type of commentators (scholars, public officials, consultants, etc.), we find texts analyzing the reform, which are usually contemporary with the approval of the new
Code. This dimension of literary production is fundamental, since it
allows us to reflect upon how local operators were actually reacting to
139
140
141

See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 51.
See Binder, supra note 39, at 12-13.
See REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES

EN AMIRICA LATINA: RESULTADOS DEL

PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 39, at 128, 147-150.
142 See id. at 89-95 (showing that some reforms could actually

not reform anything
if they only contain abstract and non-transformative provisions and explaining the
administrative and cultural challenges of the reforms).
143 See id. at 100 (showing that the working relationship between prosecutors
and
police officers is problematic in a number of the reforms). CEJA, in the different
reports it has issued, has been particularly concerned with the roles in the proceedings, which actors exercise those roles, how the different actors are administratively organized and how they are performing their roles.
144 See Rodolfo Daniel Barroso Griffith & Marcelo Fernando Nieto Di Biase, La
Reforma Procesal Penal en Chubut. Implementaci6n de una Nueva Gesti6n Judicial, in REFORMAS DE LA JUSTICIA EN AMtRICA LATINA: EXPERIENCIAS DE INNOVACION supra note 40, at 93-129.
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the reforms, how they were characterizing them, and how they have
judged their outcomes.
Within the second dimension of commentators we find authors
that produce literature about the Reform Movement in general. They
have written texts evaluating adversarial legislations in Latin
America from a broader perspective. Notwithstanding the differences
between both dimensions of commentators, their discourses are fundamentally the same. This paper has used as sources both kinds of commentators. These commentators are part of what I called in the 14first
5
pages, the "mainstream discourse" about the Reform Movement.
Thus far we have reconstructed the mainstream discourse
the
inquisitorial/adversarial dichotomy and about criminal proabout
in Latin America. Now, let us test that discourse. We
reform
cedure
concrete rules of each of the new Codes (including the
the
will analyze
Model Ibero-American Code) in order to evaluate if they in fact adhere
to the "traits" assigned by scholars to adversarial models and to assess
if they were in fact "global reforms" of procedural schemes. According
to the mainstream discourse the legislations in the region were dramatically replaced and the resulting statutes universally share several
"new" characteristics, due to the adversarial nature of the reform. The
following analysis will allow us to see if any new legal institution was
in fact homogeneously implemented and is now commonly shared
across the region as a result of the reform.
1.5. Analysis of the reforms
Parallel to the similarities and differences analyzed below, it is
important to take into account a preliminary consideration. The comparative analysis I undertook used as a base the text of the reformed
Codes. Complementary laws and further reform efforts in each jurisdiction were not factored into the analysis. In fact, one whole different
subject of academic interest could be the reforms of the reforms. Such
a study would reveal the acceptance that each reform generated in the
legal community. Apparently only Venezuela has had, after the adversarial reform, a new major transformation of its criminal justice system, a transformation that occurred in 2012. For the purpose of this
paper our focus is placed in the Venezuelan Code passed during the
time that Latin America was experiencing the reform movement.

145

See

Vargas,

Presentation,in

REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMSRICA LA-

TINA: RESULTADOS DEL PROYECTO DE SEGUIMIENTO,

supra note 39, at 7-10.
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1.5.1.
Code.

The commonly shared traits of the new Codes and the Model

When one analyzes and compares the new statutes, one can
actually observe they share several features. However, two interesting
claims come from this comparison. First, those traits do not fit into the
catalogue of characteristics asserted by scholars as typically adversarial, and in some cases, openly contradict the ideals advertised as
adversarial. Second, many of those traits existed even before the reform movement and are common to criminal procedure structures in
the region, before and after the reform era. Let us analyze and compare the common rules we can find in all the fifteen new Codes and the
Model Code:
A. All the Codes begin with a list of procedural/substantive guarantees. 14 6 This catalogue includes, among others, the right to a
defense, the right to counsel, to liberty, the prohibition against
double jeopardy, and the presumption of innocence. 1 4 7 These
guarantees existed in the region even before the reform, in the
old inquisitorial Codes, and in several Latin American constitutions. 1 4 1 One can hardly say that they are a consequence of adversarial reforms, or that criminal procedure systems in the
region before the Reform Era disregarded such fundamental
rights.
B. All of the Codes include a set of rules about the parties (or participants) involved in the proceedings. 14 9 More specifically, they
include rules about their rights and duties. With respect to the
defendant, all legislations in the region protect the right to effective assistance of counsel during all stages of the process and
along all encounters with public officials in charge of the inves146

See, e.g.CODIGO

PROCESAL PENAL DE LA NACION [COD. PROC. PEN.] [CRIMINAL

art. 1 (Bolentino Oficial, 1991) (Arg.); CODIGO PROCESA PENAL
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1-4 (Costa Rica); CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art 1-5(Ecu.).
PROCEDURE CODE]

147

See,

e.g.CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL DE LA NACION [COD. PROC. PEN.] [CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE CODE] art.

1, 4 (Official Gazette, 1991) (Arg.);

[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art.

1-4 (Costa Rica);

CODIGO PROCESA PENAL

CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PE-

NAL [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art 1-5 (Ecu.).
148 See, e.g. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION]
Octubre
RICA
149

de 2008, art.

20 de

3(Ecu); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA

7de noviembre de 1949, tftulo III (Costa Rica).

See, e.g.,
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IBERO-AMERICA]

PARA IBEROAMtERICA

[hereinafter M.C.];

[CRIMINAL

CODIGO DE

PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE EL SALVADOR [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF EL SALVADOR] [hereinafter

C.P.P.El Salvador]; CODIGO
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tigation and trial. 150 All the new Codes also protect the right
all across the
against self-incrimination. 151 These rights 1existed
52
region since before the reform movement.
With respect to the defendant, none of the new Codes
(except Colombia's law) include rules that encourage or even
permit the defendant and defense counsel to conduct private investigations. 15 3 Thus, of all the fifteen new adversarial models
the defense to obtain
in the region, only one expressly15 allows
4
evidence in preparation for trial.
Can this allow us to assert that systems that fall under
the inquisitorial category, according to the mainstream discourse, prohibit private investigations? It does not. It seems obvious that any system-no matter its characterization as
"adversarial" or "inquisitorial"-demands that a party prove
what it argues. It is obvious that defense counsel is always entitled, and even required, to provide evidence in support of its
theory. One could argue that adversarial systems incentivize
defense counsel to be more active and diligent in the execution
of its role. Nonetheless, it is self-evident that even in inquisitorial systems, if the defendant does not want to remain silent
and simply wait for the prosecution to discharge its burden, he
must present exculpatory evidence that can he can only obtain
through private investigations. No inquisitorial system prior to
the reform in the region expressly prohibited the defendant
from finding and presenting evidence.155
See, e.g., M.C., supra note 149, art. 5; C.P.P.El Salvador, supra note 149, art.
10; C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149, arts. 14-15.
151 See, e.g., M.C., supra note 149, art. 41; C.P.P.El Salvador,supra note 149, art.
82; C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149, art. 102.
152 See generally, e.g., Langer, supra note 24, at 638-39 (explaining that while
rights to defense and against self-incrimination existed in pre-reform Argentina,
keeping pretrial investigations secret and defendants ignorant of charges against
them violated these rights).
153 Compare CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE COLOMBIA [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF COLOMBIA] arts. 267-68 [hereinafter C.P.P. Colombia] (permitting
defendant to request his own investigation), with, e.g., C.P.P.El Salvador, supra
note 149 (does not permit a private investigation by the defendant), and C.P.P.
Honduras, supra note 149 (does not permit a private investigation by the
defendant).
154 Compare C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, arts. 267-68, with, e.g., C.P.P. El
Salvador, supra note 149, and C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149.
155 In Colombia, under a typically inquisitorial scheme, one of the most famous
cases in its recent history resulted in an acquittal precisely thanks to investigatory
efforts undertaken by defense counsel after which a conspiracy against the defendant was unraveled. I am referring to the Gabriel Arango Bacci case before the
150

Supreme Court. See generally HERNANDO
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Furthermore, it seems paradoxical, commentators
claim, that allowing defendants to engage more actively in the
investigative phase and awarding them more rights were objectives of the reform. Some authors in the U.S. have precisely
complained that the adversarial model lacks sufficient possibilities for the defendant to participate in pretrial activities. 156 In
the context of grand jury investigations, proceedings are secret,
so defendants have no access or real participation in the pretrial phase. In the U.S., only in probable cause hearings may
defendants intervene within an adversary context before trial.
With respect to the prosecution, the new Codes regulate
the existence and activity of the Public Ministry, also known as
the prosecutorial body.1 5 7 They generally say that the Ministry
must execute its duties objectively. 158 Prosecutors must be unbiased and conduct integral investigations. "Integral" means investigations that must seek exculpatory evidence in addition to
incriminatory evidence. 159 This trait is common in criminal pro160
cedure systems in the region before and after the reform.
However, this trait is not adversarial according to the catalogue
of features structured by commentators. If one were to confront
this rule of "integral investigations" with the catalogue of adversarial ideals expressed by commentators, one could say that
there is nothing accusatorial in a system that commands one of
the adversaries to actively search for evidence that benefits the
opposing party. For all purposes, this means the prosecution
substitutes defense counsel in its role and, in turn, replaces it
confusing the main functions of prosecution and defense. The
prosecution is thus an impartial truth-finder rather than an
adversary.
One could argue that the existence alone of an institution such as the Public Ministry is a revolution that brought a
new institution unknown to inquisitorial schemes prior to the
Arango
Bacci Case] (2011) (Col.).
156 Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
RANTE. EL CASO ARANGo BACCI [Behind the footprints of the admiral. The

CriminalProcedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960).
157 See, e.g., M.C., supra note 149, arts. 68-72; C.P.P.El Salvador,supra note 149,
arts. 74-79; C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149, art. 92.
158 See, e.g., M.C., supra note 149, art. 68; C.P.P.El Salvador,supra note 149, art.
75; C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149, art. 93.
159 See, e.g., M.C., supra note 149, art. 68; C.P.P.El Salvador,supra note 149, art.
75; C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149, art. 93.
160 See generally, e.g., Langer, supra note 24, at 639-41 (discussing the progression
of Argentinian law with regard to prosecutorial investigations).
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reforms. 161 After all, there were no Public Ministries before the
reforms.162 Is this really the case? Does the existence alone of a
prosecutorial body translate into the incorporation of adversarial ideals, at least in the sense the mainstream discourse
would expect? I believe it does not. The Public Ministry created
by the reforms in many cases simply replaced the old instruction judges.1 6 3 In many Latin American countries it was just a
change in name. Even though Public Ministries exist, if they
are assigned the same functions of old instruction judges, the
operational outcome is identical and no substantial legal difference appears. 164 Cultural and legal transformations are necessary to overcome the legacy of inquisitorial investigations.
The creation of a new public institution alone, without
regard to its functions, does not itself necessarily result in the
profound transformation of a criminal procedure system. Therefore, I reject the idea that the creation of Public Ministries
across the region as a consequence of adversarial reforms actually reflects-in all fifteen countries-an adversarial reform.
We must also keep in mind that that some jurisdictions had
Public Ministries or some sort of "independent" prosecutorial
body since before the reform, although performing typically inquisitorial functions (e.g. Colombia).1 6 5 Furthermore, even after
the reform, prosecutorial bodies are not always independent
from the judiciary. On the contrary,
it many cases they are still
16 6
part of the judicial branch.
Finally, all the Codes regulate civil actors or victims.
The procedural and substantive rights assigned to them are in
161

See Riego, supra note 40, at 7.

See, e.g., Claudio Pavlic V6liz, CriminalJustice Reform: A New Form of Criminal Justice for Chile, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1363, 1366-69 (2012) (discussing the creation of the Public Ministry in Chile during the reform process).
163 See, e.g., Langer, supra note 24, at 639-41 (discussing Argentina's switch from
a pre-reform system in which the judge was responsible for conducting a pretrial
investigation to a post-reform system in which that responsibility lies with the
prosecutor).
164 See Mauricio Duce, Reforma Procesal Penal y Reconfiguraci6n del Ministerio
162

Publico en Amdrica Latina, in

SEMINARiO REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL,

supra note

48, at 14-15.
165 See, e.g., Luz Estella Nagle, Colombia's Faceless Justice: A Necessary Evil,
Blind Impartialityor Modern Inquisition?,61 U. PITT. L. REV. 881, 892-930 (2000)
(describing the reforms made to the Colombian criminal justice system, including
to the role of the preexisting Public Ministry).
166 MAURIcIo

DUCE,
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TERIO PUBLICO EN AMERICA LATINA

tales 2000).
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some cases broad and in others, narrow and restricted to economic reparation. The involvement of civil actors in criminal
proceedings, as parties or participants, at least for seeking reparation, was a common feature before the reforms.
However, awarding broad rights to victims, and especially allowing them to actively participate in the proceedings,
does not appear as a characteristic of adversarial models according to commentators. Furthermore, systems none would
contest are adversarial in nature-such as federal criminal procedure in the U.S.-do not come close to any Latin American
jurisdiction, before or after the reform, with respect to the generosity of rights awarded to victims and their possibility of participating in the process. Hence, respect for victims' rights does
not appear to be a typical trait of the accusatory process incorporated in the region as a consequence of the reform movement.
The similarity among Latin American systems with respect to
the protection they provide to victims has other causes, independent from the adversarial era. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to analyze the history and the reasons for
victims' rights in the region.
C. Several new Codes require the maintenance of written files of
the proceedings. 167 The compulsory existence of a "file" or "dossier," along the investigation and trial is, according to commentators, a typical trait of inquisitorial systems.1 6 8 Nonetheless,
several Latin American jurisdictions, even after the adversarial
reform, include the obligation for officials to keep some sort of
file that integrates in writing every single relevant event, act,
or proof. There are, however, a number of exceptions in the
region.
D. All Codes have rules concerning arrest, seizure of property, and
pre-trial detention. 16 9 Concern for these issues has been homogeneously shared in the region since before the reforms.
However, we must remember that several commentators on Latin American reform expressed that the reforms
167

See, e.g.,

C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE COSTA RICA [CRIMINAL PROCE-

DURE CODE OF COSTA RICA]

art. 275 [hereinafter C.P.P. Costa Rica];

CODIGO DE

PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE PARAGUAY [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF PARAGUAY]

arts. 281, 283 [hereinafter C.P.P.Paraguay];CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE
PEROl [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF PERfl]

arts. 134-41 [hereinafter C.P.P.Perd].

168 See, e.g., C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167, art. 275; C.P.P. Paraguay,supra

note 167, arts. 281, 283; C.P.P. Perd, supra note 167, arts. 134-41.
169 See, e.g., C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149, art. 275 (concerns arrests), arts.
284-93 (concerns seizure of property), arts. 320-35 (concerns pre-trial detention);
C.P.P.Colombia, supra note 153, arts. 297-305 (concerns arrests), arts. 82-91 (concerns seizure of property), arts. 307-20 (concerns pre-trial detention).
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would bring greater respect for liberty, hence, reducing pre17
trial detentions."
In fact, this was advertised in several countries as one of the goals of adversarial reform. 17 1 Nonetheless,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the InterAmerican Commission, without suggesting or requiring partystates (several of which have participated in the reform era) to
transform to the accusatory process, had held that parties
should ensure that pre-trial detention be imposed only when
strictly necessary (e.g., flight risk, danger to the community,
1 72
and possibility of tampering with evidence or witnesses).
Therefore, can respect for liberty be catalogued as a strictly adversarial trait?
It is paradoxical to observe that an adversarial system
such as the one found in U.S. federal criminal procedure, shows
numbers of pre-trial detention higher than the ones produced
by several inquisitorial Latin American systems before
the re174
form 173 and by accusatorial systems after the reform.

170

See generally, e.g., Aya Fujimura-Fanselow & Elisabeth Wickeri, "We are Left

to Rot:" Arbitrary and Excessive PretrialDetention in Bolivia, 36 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 812, 822-30 (2013) (detailing Bolivia's pre-reform lack of respect for liberty,
and explaining how reforms were intended to rectify the issue of lengthy and frequent pretrial detentions).
171 See, e.g., Hendrix, supra note 15, at 391-95 (describing Guatemalan reform's
goal to cut down on pretrial detention); Langer, supra note 24, at 632 (stating that
a goal of criminal procedure reform in many Latin American countries was to
shorten pretrial detention periods).
172 See generally Sudrez Rosero v. Ecuador (Arts. 29 and 55 Rules of Procedure of
the Court), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 35 (Nov. 12, 1997); Acosta Calder6n v.
Ecuador (Arts. 29, 31, 55, 56, 58 Rules of Procedure of the Court and Art. 63(1)
American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 129 (Jun.
24, 2005); Tibi v. Ecuador (Arts. 29, 31, 37(6), 56, 58 Rules of Procedure of the
Court, and Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 114 (Sept. 7, 2004); G6mez Paquiyauri v. Perd, (Arts. 29, 56, 57, 58
Rules of Procedure of the Court and Art 63 (1) American Convention on Human
Rights) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110 (Jul. 8, 2004); Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, (Arts. 29, 55, 56, 57 Rules of Procedure of the Court and Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103 (Nov. 27,
2003).
173 See generally Thomas H. Cohen, PretrialDetention and Misconduct in Federal

District Courts, 1995-2010,

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS

(Feb. 21, 2013), http://
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Mark Motivans, Federal Justice
Statistics, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2208.
174 See CRISTIAN RIEGO Y MAURICIO DucE, PRISION PREVENTIVA Y REFORMA
PROCESAL PENAL EN AMI RICA LATINA: EVALUACION Y PERSPECTIVAS
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E.

In the majority of new Codes, judges during trial can search for
and collect evidence, and can call witnesses. 1 75 According to
commentators that catalogue the role of judges as "passive
umpires," this feature seems to openly contradict the nature of
adversarial models. 1 7 6 Evidently, this trait existed in inquisitorial codes before the reform movement. It is paradoxical that
this feature is treated as typically inquisitorial by commentators, when the Federal Rules of Evidence in the U.S. include
it.177

F. No Code includes rules regarding character evidence or the best
evidence rule with the exception of Colombia's codification of
the best evidence rule. 17s Rules concerning such issues are typical in U.S. adversarial criminal procedure at the federal and
state levels.17 9 However, no Latin American jurisdictions included these topics in the new adversarial legislations.
G. It is true all Codes after the reform era assert that trials shall
be oral and public, and that evidence and witnesses shall be
presented in the immediate presence of the fact-finder/decisionmaker.18 0 Some argue, as seen supra, that the adversarial reform brought a universal shift in the region, by replacing written/secret proceedings with public/oral trials. Are trials in the
region actually public and oral after the reform movement? I
claim that the normative statement alone proclaiming that triDUCE, PRISION PREVENTIVA Y REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL EN AMIRICA LATINA:
EVALUACION Y PERSPECTIVAS

(2011), available at prisionpreventivarpp.pdf; see

also Luis

RUDOLFO RAMIREZ GARCIA AND MIGUEL ANGEL URBINA, LAS REFORMAS
PROCESALES PENALES EN AMERICA LATINA: INFORMES NACIONALES GUATEMALA 443

(2000).
175 See, e.g., C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, art. 397 (allows judges to ask additional questions of witnesses following the parties' examinations). See generally
Leonard L. Cavise, The Transition from the Inquisitorialto the Accusatorial System of Trial Procedure:Why Some Latin American Lawyers Hesitate, 53 WAYNE L.
REV. 785, 807-08 (2007) (explaining that even after reforms, Latin American
judges are unaccustomed to taking a passive, referee-like role in the courtroom).
176 See, e.g., Maximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International
Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMp. L. 835, 878-85 (2005) (detailing the differences
between the traditional "passive umpire" role of adversarial court judges and the
more managerial role that many have begun to play).
177 See FED. R. EVID. 614.
178 Compare, e.g., M.C., supra note 149 (no rules regarding character evidence or
best evidence rule), and C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149 (no rules regarding
character evidence or best evidence rule), with C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153,
art. 424-34 (deals with production of documents and best evidence rule).
179

See

180

See, e.g., M.C., supra note 149, arts. 291-331; C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note

FED.

R.

EVID.

404-405, 412-415, 608-609.

149, arts. 366-391; C.P.P. Honduras, supra note 149, arts. 308-310.
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als shall be public and oral is not enough to hold that trials in
the new Codes are actually oral/public and thus, adversarial, as
commentators state.18 1
8 2
No Code recognizes hearsay as an evidentiary issue.
In the majority of Codes, hearsay is not even mentioned as a
topic or subject of any rule.1 s 3 Furthermore, no Code includes
rules concerning out of court statements that are offered in
trial, or for that matter, during the investigation. 184 When one
actually analyzes the Codes, one can observe that none show
concern for the presentation of out of court statements. This
shows two contradictions with the adversarial rationale: accusatory systems prefer, and are deeply respectful of, live-in-court
testimony. Testimony is not really oral and public and in the
presence of the fact finder when it was given out of court and is
brought by documents or hearsay witnesses. This affects not
only the credibility of witnesses but also disregards the very nature of adversarial models, which depend on testing through
cross-examination the reliability and accuracy of statements. In
Crawford, the United States Supreme Court argued that the
problem with hearsay is not just about reliability of the untested out of court statement, it is also about the possibility for
the defendant to contradict and confront witnesses offered
against him. 8 ' When out of court statements are offered, and
admitted, opposing counsel does not actually have a chance to
test and examine the evidence that is being offered against him.
Only the new Codes in Colombia and Peru included
rules that explicitly show concern for hearsay or out of court
statements.1 6 Honduras (Art. 199) does not expressly regulate
hearsay but exhibits some "preference" for non-hearsay

statements. 187
181

See Miguel A. Mendez, Shifting from the Inquisitorialto the AdversarialModel

in Criminal Cases: Is A Hearsay Rule Indispensable?, 5 FlU

L. REV. 13, 39 (2009).

Compare, e.g., M.C., supra note 149 (does not mention hearsay), and C.P.P. El
Salvador, supra note 149 (does not mention hearsay), with, e.g., C.P.P.Honduras,
supra note 149, art. 199 (does not expressly regulate hearsay, but exhibits preference for non-hearsay statements).
183 See, e.g., C.P.P. El Salvador,supra note 149; C.P.P.Paraguay,supranote 167;
182

CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE VENEZUELA [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF

(hereinafter C.P.P. Venezuela].
See e.g., C.P.P.El Salvador,supra note 149; C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 183.
See Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); See also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006); Giles v. California 554 U.S. 353, 357 (2008);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 557 U.S. 305, 323 (2009).
186 See C.P.P.PerP, supra note 167, art. 378.
VENEZUELA]

184
185

187 See C.P.P.Honduras, supra note 149, art. 199.
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Therefore I reject the claim that only because a system
adopts abstract rules proclaiming public/oral trials, an adversarial model is implemented. A system that is not concerned
for, and does not prefer, live-in-court testimony, which opposing
counsel can directly examine and confront as a true adversary,
at least according to the list of features structured by commentators, is not adversarial. Concern for hearsay, and regulation
of it, is not just a formal issue: it reflects the ideals a system
protects and respects.
Thus, if we apply the catalogue of features considered as
adversarial by commentators, then the common Latin American post-reform rule declaring that trials shall be "public and
oral" does not by itself truly create an accusatory process.
I offer further arguments to sustain this claim. Every
Code, as they did prior to the reforms, regulates documents as
one of the means of proof.188 However, after the reform, no Code
shows concern for hearsay that can be imbedded and thus introduced at trial with documents.1 8 9 Documents can be admitted
without considering the nature of the statements they include.
Moreover, nine Codes (Model, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Costa Rica, Paraguay, the 1986 Draft, Venezuela, Honduras,
and Peru) allow evidence and witnesses to be presented during
appeals when the case is before superior courts for review.1 °
Does this in any way respect the principle of public/oral trials
before the fact-finder? Appellate review can hardly be considered the proper space of adversarial confrontation, at least in
the terms in which commentators deal with accusatory ideals.
Furthermore, all Codes include rules that allow reading
documents and prior out-of-court statements during trial.1 91
See, e.g., C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, art. 259; C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra
note 167, art. 354; CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL DE ARGENTINO [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE OF ARGENTINA] [hereinafter C.P.P.Argentina] art. 265.
189 See generally C.P.P.El Salvador, supra note 149; C.P.P.Paraguay,supra note
167; C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 183.
188

190 See M.C., supra note 149; C.P.P.El Salvador,supra note 149, art. 474; CODIGO

[C.P.P.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF
[hereinafter C.P.P. Guatemala]; C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167,
art. 441; C.P.P. Paraguay,supra note 167, art. 464; PROYECTO DE C6DIGO DE
PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL PARA LA REPJBLICA DE ARGENTINA DE 1986 [CRIMINAL PRODE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE GUATEMALA
GUATEMALA]

CEDURE CODE

1986 DRAFT

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA]

[hereinafter Draft]

C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 182, art. 450; C.P.P.Honduras, supra note 149, art.
452; C.P.P. Per6, supra note 167, art. 424.
191 See, e.g., C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149, art. 350; CODIGO DE
PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE BOLIVIA [C.P.P.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF BoLIVIA] [hereinafter C.P.P.Bolivia] art. 355.
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This possibility of course, although restricted-or narrowly tailored-in several Latin American new legislations, was a typical trait of previous inquisitorial models in the region." 2
Perhaps only Colombia, as an exception to the general rule in
the region, does not have any rule explicitly allowing witnesses
to read documents during trial, in substitution for live
testimony.
Likewise, the way expert opinions are presented, is a
procedural concern that shows more or less respect for the adversarial traits highlighted by commentators. If experts do not
mandatorily have to testify, but rather, can submit their opinions in writing to the Court, without being subject to live-incourt cross examination, respect for public/oral trials and adversarial ideals, seems weak. Reformed Codes in Costa Rica
(Art. 353), El Salvador (Art. 346), Peru (Art. 346), Colombia
(Art. 412), Honduras (Arts. 244, 326 and 327), and Chile (Art.
329) demand experts to testify about their opinions in court,
subject to interrogation by other parties and in some cases,
even the judge. 193 Panama (Art. 413), with some exceptions, requires testimony from experts.1 9 4 However, Guatemala (Arts.
364.1 and 376) and the Model Code (Art. 300.5) allow expert
opinions to be read in evidence without the presence of the experts. 19 5 The Draft (Art. 187), Dominican Republic (Art. 312.3),
Venezuela (Art. 341), and Paraguay (Art. 388) also allow written opinions without expert testimony, thus, to introduce expert
See M.C., supra note 149, arts. 300(3), 300(6), 300(7) (allowing reading documents and prior out of court statements during trial); C.P.P. Guatemala, supra
note 190, arts. 363, 364, 380; C.P.P.El Salvador, supra note 149, arts. 330, 351;
C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167,: arts. 334, 354; C.P.P. Paraguay, supra note
167, arts. 371, 393; C.P.P.Venezuela, supra note 183, arts. 341, 359; C.P.P. CODIGO
192

DE PROCEDIMIENTO

PENAL

DE

CHILE

[C.P.P.]

[CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

CODE

OF

[hereinafter C.P.P. Chile] arts. 331, 332. 333; C.P.P. Bolivia, supra note
191, art. 355; C.P.P. Honduras, supra note 149, arts. 311, 332; CODIGO DE
CHILE]

PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

[C.P.P.]

[CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

[hereinafter C.P.P. Domincan Republic], arts. 312,
329; C.P.P. Peril, supra note 167, art. 383; CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL DE
PANAMA [C.P.P.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF PANAMA] [hereinafter C.P.P.PanCODE OF DOMINICAN

REPUBLIC]

amd] art. 379; Draft, supra note 190, arts. 191, 192, 300, 316.
193 See C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167, art. 353; C.P.P.El Salvador,supra note
149, art. 346; C.P.P. Perd, supra note 167, art. 346; C.P.P. Colombia, supra note
153, art. 412; C.P.P.Honduras, supra note 149, arts. 244, 326, 327; C.P.P.Bolivia,
supra note 192, art. 329.
194 C.P.P.Panama, supra note 192, art 413.
195 See C.P.P. Guatemala, supra note 190, arts. 364.1, 376; M.C., supra note 149,
art. 300.5.
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opinions, the expert does not have to testify." 6 In Bolivia the
new Code included no rule demanding experts to testify about
their opinions." 7 One could hardly claim these Codes actually
introduced the adversarial ideal of public/oral trials where livein-court testimony is respected. Therefore, according to the
traits pointed out by commentators, these jurisdictions show an
absence of some very important accusatorial features.
The exclusionary rule is an interesting trait that can be found
in all the new Codes. 198 However, excluding evidence as a remedy for violation of fundamental rights or procedural rules, although not always falling in the region under the rubric of the
"exclusionary rule," has been present since before the reforms.
Several Constitutions in Latin America (for example Honduras,
Colombia, and Paraguay) before the enactment of new criminal
procedure legislations, declared null or void any evidence obtained with violation of at least some fundamental guarantees.1 9 9 Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, independent from any suggestion that party-states
needed to adopt adversary systems, considered that exclusion is
the appropriate remedy for violation of certain safeguards.2 ° °
Therefore, one could hardly argue that the presence of the exclusionary rule in all the new Codes is a direct consequence of
incorporating adversarial ideals in the region. Nonetheless, one
should keep in mind that not all exclusionary rules in the region operate in the same way. Some countries adopt such a
remedy only for some police conduct, like torture, others adopt

See Draft, supra note 190, art. 187; C.P.P. Dominican Republic, supra note
192, art. 312.3; C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 182, art. 341; C.P.P.Paraguay,supra
note 167, art. 388.
197 See generally C.P.P. Bolivia, supra note 191; C.P.P. Guatemala, supra note
196

190.
19 See, e.g., C.P.P. Argentina, supra note 188, art. 237; C.P.P.
Dominican Republic, supra note 192, art. 130; C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, art. 123.
199 See, e.g., CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE HONDURAS [C.P.] art. 100; CONSTITUCION
POLTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 29; CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE PARAGUAY [C.P.]
art. 17.
200 See generally Cabrera Garcia y Montiel Flores v. M6xico (Arts. 62(3) and 63(1)
American Convention on Human Rights and Arts 30, 32 38, 67, 57, 58, and 61 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, (Nov. 26,
2010); Bayarri v. Argentina (Arts 62(3) and 63(1) of the American Convention on
Human Rights and Arts. 29, 31, 37(6), 56, and 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Court), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 187, (Oct. 30, 2008); Castillo Petruzzi v.
Peru (Arts. 55 and 57 Court's Rules of Procedures), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
52, (May. 30, 1999).
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it in a broader fashion.2 ° 1 Some expressly amplify the rule to
evidence obtained as the direct or indirect consequence of the
initial illegal evidence, known as "fruit of the poisonous
tree. 2 o2
Symbolic issues-typical in adversarial systems-as simple as
the obligation for judges to use robes during oral hearings are
only found in two Codes in the region: Venezuela and
Colombia.2 °3
All Codes include articles concerning mandatory judicial intervention/authorization prior to the execution of investigative
acts that restrict fundamental rights, such as searches of
homes, eavesdropping in communications, or anticipated
proofs. 20 4 Authorizations, in some cases, take the form of warrants.2 0 5 This mandatory authorization is always given by judicial officers, independent from the prosecutorial body.20 6 These
types of rules were not present in any legislation in the region

See M.C., supra note 149, art. 148 (adopting the exclusionary rule as a remedy

only for certain police conduct); C.P.P. Guatemala,supra note 190, art. 186 (adopting the exclusionary rule as a remedy only for certain police conduct). But see M.C,
supra note 149, arts. 148-149 (possibly interpreted as rules that generate any illegal proofs to be excluded); M.C., supra note 149, arts. 281, 183-186, 149 (interpreting rules that generate any illegal proofs as excluded); C.P.P. El Salvador, supra
note 149, art. 15 (exclusionary rule); C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167, art. 181,
exclusionary rule; C.P.P.Paraguay,supra note 167, arts. 17 and 36 (1992) (excluding illegal evidence before the criminal procedure reform); C.P.P. Costa Rica,
supra note 167, art. 174 (new Code adopting the exclusionary rule); C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 183, art. 197; C.P.P. Bolivia, supra note 192, art. 276; C.P.P.
Bolivia, supra note 191, art. 172; C.P.P.Honduras,supra note 149, art. 88 (1982)
(before the procedural reform- declared null any evidence obtained in violation of
the right against self-incrimination); C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167, art. 200
(new Code adopting the exclusionary rule); C.P.P.DominicanRepublic, supra note
192, art. 167; C.P.P. Perd, supra note 167, art. VIII; C.P.P. Panamd, supra note
192, arts. 17, 381; C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, art. 29 (1991) (Old Constitution before the reform era- excluding any evidence obtained in violation of due
process); C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, Law 600 f(2000) (inquisitorial law prior
to the new legislation and thus replaced by the adversary system, excluding evidence obtained in violation of procedural rules); Draft, supra note 190, arts. 225228, 147-149; Politica de los Estados Unidos Meicanos [C.P.], art. 20(a)(IX) Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DPI, 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
202 See C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, art. 23 (new Code adopting the exclusionary rule and the theory of "fruits of the poisonous tree").
203 See C.P.P. Perd, supra note 167,; C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, art. 185;
C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 183, art. 148.
204 See e.g., C.P.P., Paraguay,supra note 167, art. 128; C.P.P. Perd, supra
note
167, art. 186; C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149, art. 187.
205 See e.g., C.P.P.Bolivia, supra note 191, art. 181.
206 See Bischoff, supra note 25 at 37.
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before the reform, and they are, in consequence, a result of the
adversarial movement in Latin America.2 ° 7 According to commentators, one of the goals of the introduction of accusatory
systems was to separate, segregate, and divide the roles of prosecution and adjudication, during investigation and trial. 20 8
Hence, the idea of previous authorizations is that a judge-independent from the prosecutor-intervenes to control any limitation of essential guarantees, thus stripping the prosecutor
from what should be a strictly judicial function: restricting fundamental rights. Any limitation on rights is to some extent judicial, and therefore should only be the result, as a general rule,
of judicial decisions. 20 9 The question about how effective judicial intervention has actually been in the protection of fundamental rights, will not be addressed in this paper.
Even though intervention of independent judges is new
in the region, we must not forget that prosecutorial bodies
(mainly instruction judges) in the region used to have judicial
functions. 210 Thus, it would be inaccurate to state that judicial
intervention in the restriction of fundamental rights was unknown in Latin America. Thus, I claim one could not argue this
is truly a new feature incorporated as a result of the Reform
Movement. In any event, this transformation would not be homogeneous in the region because at least one country retained
some sort of judicial investigation: El Salvador maintains instruction judges during the last part of the investigation
phase.2 1 1

207
208

23

See id. at 5.
See LAs REFORMAS

PROCESALES PENALES EN AM1ARICA LATINA,

supra note 41, at

See M.C., supra note 149, arts. 49, 39, 36, 35, 153, 162, 206, 214, 235, 248, 259
and 260; C.P.P.Guatemala,supra note 190, arts. 187, 190, 200, 203, 205; C.P.P.El
Salvador, supra note 149, arts. 173 180; C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167, arts.
188-190, 193, 198, 277, 293; C.P.P. Paraguay,supra note 167, arts. 187, 195, 200
,282; C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 183, arts. 217, 219, 225 233, 234, 291; C.P.P
Chile, supra note 192, arts. 95, 157, 191, 197, 217, 218, 219, 222, 236; C.P.P.Bolivia, supra note 191, arts. 180 190; C.P.P. Honduras, supra note 149, arts. 177,
212 219, 221, 223, 224, 277; C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, arts. 84, 91, 154,
249, 250, 274; C.P.P.Dominican Republic, supra note 192, arts. 180, 191, 192 and
287; C.P.P. Perd,supra note 167, arts. 203, 211, 218, 224, 226, 230, 233, 235, 237,
242; C.P.P. Panamd,supra note 192, arts. 278, 279, 296 and 310-312; Draft, supra
note 190, arts. 153, 154, 162, 165, 167, 248, 258.
210 See Bischoff, supra note 25, at 37.
211 See C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149, art. 411.
209
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Every jurisdiction in the region allows parties to access the evidence that prosecutors have gathered.2 1 2 Access may come
early in the proceedings when the investigative phase begins, or
later on, when the accusation, or some sort of indictment, is
presented. 213 The notion that parties-primarily the victims
and the defense-must be allowed at some point to study the
case that the prosecution is going to present, or is presenting,
seems common to adversarial and inquisitorial models. Jurisdictions may present regulatory particularities with respect to
the extent of evidence that needs to be provided to the parties,
the means for accessing such evidence, the moment for it, or the
obligation of the defendant to show its evidence to the prosecution and the victim. Therefore, I claim that access to the file, in
inquisitorial systems, and discovery/disclosure of evidence, in
adversarial systems, shows a common concern in both criminal
procedure models. A concern for permitting parties in preparation of trial to study the evidence that will be presented by
others.
All the new Codes include rules regarding: jurisdiction, competence and organization of tribunals within the judiciary, causes
for recusing judges, the police-or better, the judicial policegeneral procedural rules, permitted investigative actions and
their requirements, notification to the parties of procedural decisions, invalid procedural acts, ways of initiating proceedings
and of giving notice to the prosecution about the commission of
offenses (noticia criminis), appeals, the possibility of dismissing
cases before trial if certain requirements are met, congruence
between charging decisions and sentences, sentencing, treatment of prisoners, and parole.2" 4 These rules existed in the region even before the reform, in the old inquisitorial Codes.
Thus, they are common in Latin American systems before and
after the Movement, and cannot be construed as a result of adversarial reforms.
Some distinctions among the new Codes.

Parallel to the various similarities pointed out above, some
Codes include distinct rules that set them from the majority. Below we
See e.g., id., art. 76; C.P.P. Paraguay,supra note 167, art. 297; C.P.P. Peri,
supra note 167, art. 68.
213 See e.g., C.P.P. Perii, supra note 167, art. 68 (allowing access to research conducted by police).
214 See, e.g., C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153; C.P.P. Paraguay,supra note 167,
212

C.P.P. Honduras, supra note 149,
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will analyze those differences that distinguish a number of jurisdictions, at least with respect to some traits.
A. All constitutions in Latin America, before and after the reform
included mandatory defense counsel for defendants when they
could not afford to retain it.2 15 This means that even before the
reform it was mandatory to appoint free defense counsel to indigent defendants. Some countries had public defender services
whereas others appointed counsel randomly from the list of active attorneys within the jurisdiction.
As a consequence of the reform, some jurisdictions in
Latin America created, or made mandatory for the state to later
create, public institutions in charge of providing defense counsel to indigent defendants: institutional public defender services. Some countries that already had these types of
institutions strengthened them as a consequence of the reform,
mainly by providing more training and/or funding.2 1 6 ThereSee, e.g., Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 20
§ IX, Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); Constitucion Politica De Colombia [C.P.] art.29.
216 E.g., M.C., supra note 149 (No institutional public defender service is mandated but appointed counsel must always be provided); C.P.P. Guatemala, supra
note 190 (Public defense as a public service has existed in Guatemala since 1999.
After the 1988 Draft of Professors Maier and Binder and the subsequent approval
of the new Code in 1992 and its entry in effect in 1994, the Supreme Court issued a
regulation about the Criminal Defense Service. This service depended entirely on
the Supreme Court. In 1997, while the country was advancing in overcoming the
challenges of the adversarial reform, Congress approved a law after which Public
Defense gained independence from the head of the judiciary.); C.P.P.El Salvador,
supra note 149 (No institutional public defender service is mandated but appointed counsel must always be provided. El Salvador's Constitution in 1983 according to article 194 - assigned to the Procuradorthe obligation of providing
representation to indigent defendants. In consequence, a Unit of Public Defense
was created within the Procuraduria);C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167, (No institutional public defender service is mandated but appointed counsel must always
be provided. In Costa Rica public defense was part of the judicial branch since
1970 when the Department of Public Defenders was created. With time, more
tasks were assigned to this department, including juvenile defense and post-conviction representation); C.P.P.Paraguay,supra note 167 (It is not clear if an institutional public defender service is mandated by the Code. A Public Defense
institution was created by the 1992 Constitution but according to the text of the
article it was not given functions related to criminal defense.); C.P.P. Venezuela,
supra note 183, art. 528. (mandating institutional public defender service); C.P.P.
Bolivia, supra note 191, art. 107 (An institutional public defender service is mandated but the 1994 Constitution regulated a public defense institution and a law in
2003 developed the constitutional provision.); C.P.P. Honduras, supra note 149,
art. 119. (mandating institutional public defender service); C.P.P. Dominican Republic, supra note 192 (An institutional public defender's service was made legally
215
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fore, one could argue that creation and/or professionalization
and reorganization of public defender services, was a general
consequence of all the adversarial reforms in Latin America.2 17
I believe that, as part of the adversarial ideals expressed by
commentators, jurisdictions felt they needed to create strong
defense counsels that could confront, as true adversaries, the
powers of the prosecution. A robust prosecutorial role, within
the accusatory process, demands zealous defense counsel. However, even though public defender services were created and/or
professionalized and reorganized with the reforms, appointment of gratuitous defense counsel to indigent defendants has
always been mandatory in the majority of the region.
Several of the new Codes require a written file of the proceedings to be kept. 21" Four countries differ from the general rule in
the region of allowing judges to collect evidence and call witnesses. Chile expressly forbids and prohibits judges from engaging in such conducts.21
With respect to the Public Ministry, two countries require it discharge its duties in an objective manner (the general rule in the
region) but do not require the investigation to be "integral."
Thus, in Chile and Colombia, the prosecutorial body needs only
to investigate and collect evidence for its case-in-chief, in order
to fulfill its burden at trial.
In El Salvador, the second phase of the investigation stage is
called instruction. 220 Distinctively from all the Codes in the region, which left behind instruction judges as prosecutors, El
Salvador maintained this feature. 221 Therefore, El Salvador is
the only country in the region that even after the adversarial
reform, retained instruction judges with prosecutorial
functions.

official simultaneously with the Reform); C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153 (mandating an institutional public defender service and creating it by Reform); C.P.P.
Perd, supra note 167, art. 80. mandating an institutional public defender service;
C.P.P.Panamd, supra note 192 (institutional public defender service is mandated
but existed before the reform; Draft, supra note 190 (No institutional public defender service seems to have been mandated within the text of the Draft.).
217

See

RIEGO,

supra note 40, at 7.

M.C., supra note 149, art. 254; C.P.P.Panama,supra note 192, art. 140; C.P.P.
Colombia, supra note 153, art. 147; C.P.P. Dominican Republic, supra note 192,
arts 138-139; C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149, art. 147; C.P.P. Chile, supra note
192, art. 161; C.P.P. Bolivia, supra note 191, art. 120; C.P.P.El Salvador, supra
note 149, art. 140; C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 182, art. 169.
219 C.P.P. Chile, supra note 192, art. 8.
220 See generally, C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149, art. 303.
221 C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149, arts. 301-306.
218
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1.5.3.

Certain unique features that deserve special consideration.

Some features of the adversarial reform deserve special consideration. Codes regulate these issues in dissimilar manner.
A. Assigning the fact-finding/decision-making function to lay adjudicators is a main feature of the accusatory process. Juries are a
typical trait of adversarial systems, according to commentators
of the mainstream discourse.2 2 2 This claim is partially accurate.
In reality, only the U.S. still preserves great respect for jury
trials, whereas Great Britain for example, does not award juries
the same role. Notwithstanding, very few Latin American jurisdictions that were part of the reform movement included juries
in their new Codes. Panama and El Salvador included chapters
with special rules concerning jury trials. Bolivia and Venezuela
incorporated, as a result of the reform, mix tribunals, with
judges and lay fact-finders deciding together.2 2 3 The Model
Code included an appendix about juries in case countries decided to adopt them.2 2 4 However, even though commentators
catalogue juries as typically adversarial, some systems that
could be characterized as strongly inquisitorial, have adopted
juries. 225 Therefore, one could ask, are juries necessarily and
solely found in adversarial systems?
B. A number of Latin American jurisdictions before the reform allowed defendants to unilaterally plead guilty. After the reform,
all the Codes in the region allow it. 2 2 This type of plea is an
unconditional acceptance of criminal responsibility. The judge,
in turn, has to mandatorily reduce the sentence in some proportion. This type of plea does not depend on the will of the prosecution. Therefore, no agreement or negotiation is required in
order to obtain such a punitive benefit. We must also remember
that the prosecution had no discretion before the reforms, so
Kirsten Debarba, Maintaining the Adversarial System: The Practice of Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses During Trial 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1521, 1524
(2002).
223 C.P.P. Panama, supra note 192, art. 435, C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note
149;
art. 404, C.P.P.Bolivia, supra note 191, arts. 57, 58; C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note
183, arts. 147, 148.
224 M.C., supra note 149, app. 2.
225 See Morris Ploscowe, Jury Trial in France, 29 MINN. L. REV. 376, 376 (19441945).
226 M.C., supra note 149, art.371; C.P.P.Panama,supra note 192, art. 464; C.P.P.
Paraguay,supra note 167, art. 420; C.P.P.El Salvador, supra note 149, art. 379;
C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167, art. 373; C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149, art.
373; C.P.P. Chile, supra note 192, art. 406; C.P.P.DominicanRepublic, supra note
192, arts. 363, 366; C.P.P. Honduras, supra note 149, art. 391; C.P.P. Panama,
supra note 192, arts. 220, 282, 461; C.C.P. Colombia, supra note 153, art. 356.
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there was no bargaining tool that could be used with defendants
to obtain a plea.
That being said, some inquisitorial systems have historically not allowed this possibility. 2 7 When it was precluded,
even with the admission of responsibility a trial had to be conducted and a confession was just another element of proofalong with testimonies, documents and expert opinions-to
convict.2 28
Anglo-American criminal procedure does not allow-using as an example the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-that type of plea. According to Rule 11 pleas of guilt, or
other types of pleas, are a result of agreements with the prosecution. 22 9 The prosecution accepts to dismiss charges, or assume certain positions during sentencing, in exchange for
waiver of trial rights on the part of the defendant.2 3 °
Hence, it is reasonable to ask: Where under adversarial
criminal proceedings, in the U.S. or elsewhere, do we find the
type of plea present in the region prior and after the reform? It
appears then, that guilty pleas in the Latin American legal historical tradition are not a result of the influence of adversarial
ideals.
Plea bargaining, understood as negotiation of charges or
sentences, on the other hand, is clearly linked to prosecutorial
discretion and to the history of criminal procedure in AngloAmerican tradition as we will see later in this analysis.
Across the reformed Codes in Latin America we can find
a number of combinations in the rules concerning pleas.2 3 1
Therefore, some could argue that the possibility of pleading
guilty is a universal feature of the reforms in Latin America-a
shared common denominator. Nonetheless, it is my argument
that systems since before the reform had mechanisms for reducing penalties as a consequence of accepting responsibility.
Before the reforms it was common in several jurisdictions in the
region to allow sentencing benefits when defendants confessed.
227
228

Langer, supra note 3 at 10.
Id.

229 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
230

Id.

M.C., supra note 149, art.371; C.C.P. Panama, supra note 192, art. 464; C.P.P.
Paraguay,supra note 167, art. 420; C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149, art. 379;
C.P.P. Costa Rica, supranote 167, art. 373; C.P.P. Honduras,supra note 149, art.
373; C.C.P. Chile, supra note 192, art. 406; C.C.P.Dominican Republic, supra note
231

192, arts. 363, 366; C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 182,, art. 391; C.P.P. Panama,
supra note 192, arts. 220, 282, 461; C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153, art. 356.
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Therefore, I reject the claim that this type of guilty plea is an
essential characteristic of the adversary process, and that it
was introduced in the region as a direct result of the reform
movement. A plea bargain, on the other hand, reflects
prosecutorial discretion, something unknown in the region
before the reforms. However, only a minority of countries in
Latin American incorporated bargaining.
C. Cross examination is a method for receiving testimony, typical
in the adversary process.
However, cross examination, nar
rowly construed, can be only found in Panama and Colombia. 3 3
Eventually one could argue it was also incorporated in El Salvador (Art. 348) and Costa Rica (Art. 352).234 The rest of the
Codes include methods of interrogation that do not reflect a process of adversaries in confrontation, to test the accuracy of a
witness's testimony.2 3 5 Codes in the region generally permit
judges to have broad participation in the interrogation of witnesses and allow parties, besides the prosecution and the defense, to question witnesses, present evidence, and offer
testimony of other witnesses. Therefore, the majority of the reformed Codes did not adopt cross-examination.
D. Several Codes in the region allow some sort of prosecution and/
or trial when the defendant is absent, either because he cannot
be located or because he has fled. 2 36 Even though assistance of
counsel is always guaranteed, the adversarial nature of litigation is substantially reduced when the defendant can be tried
even in his absence. Nonetheless, in several of the reformed adversarial Codes, a number of jurisdictions in the region permit
in some cases prosecution and/or trial of absent defendants.
E. Grand juries are a typical feature of criminal procedure in the
U.S. Grand juries are present in the federal level and in several
states.2 3 7 However, no such body was created in any system
within the region, as a consequence of the reform.
F. Legislations in the region differ in the particular regulation of
certain concrete issues. These issues have little to do with adversarial reform either because they were present in Codes
before the movement or because they are not related to the cata232 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY

(9th ed. 2009).

C.P.P. Panama, supra note 192, art. 398; C.P.P. Colombia, supra note 153,
arts. 276, 277.
234 C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note 149, art. 209; C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note
167, art. 352.
235 See, e.g., Venezuela, supra note 183, art. 132; C.P.P.Honduras,supra note 149,
art 224.
236 C.P.P.Bolivia, supra note 191, art. 91.
237 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6; LA. CONST. art.I § 15, TX. CONST. art. I § 10.
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logue of adversarial features established by mainstream commentators. These issues, among others, are: arrests in
flagrance, criminal treatment of minors, treatment of insane defendants, minor offenses, private prosecutions, alternative dispute resolution methods, and restorative justice.
2.

THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM IN LATIN AMERICA AND PROSECUTORIAL

DISCRETION

2.1.

What is adversarial?

Thus far we have analyzed the history of the reform movement
in Latin America as well as the final outcomes of such undertaking:
the new Codes. The reform effort in the region resulted in fifteen new
accusatorial Codes (including the 1986 Draft and the Mexican Constitution). We have called the "mainstream discourse" the literature produced by commentators with respect to the reform movement and the
"typical" features of "each of the two procedural models."
Commentators, as we have seen, usually enumerate abstract
characteristics of the two criminal procedure systems. If we compare
the reformed legislations with the a priori catalogue of "adversarial"
traits enlisted by authors then, this exercise should, in theory, tell us if
a criminal procedure system is "truly" adversarial or inquisitorial.
However, I claim it is impossible to understand in such a manner, any
of the criminal procedure reforms endured in the region over the past
two decades.
There is no doubt that the reforms in Latin America have been
unanimously characterized-and advertised-as adversarial. Nonetheless, as we have seen, no Latin American reform completely yields
to all the "typical" adversarial traits. On the other hand, several new
Codes still hold on to traits classified as "typically" inquisitorial. Are
all the commentators in the region wrong? Did the region not undertake an adversarial reform?
My contention is that "adversarial" can be understood under
multiple perspectives. The idea is simple: within the context of comparative criminal procedure in Latin America-apropos procedural reform over the past two decades-"adversarial" has different meanings,
or at least, can mean different things. Put differently, the reform
movement shows us there is no abstract or prefixed group of categories
with which we can identify systems, to characterize them as adversarial or inquisitorial. The notion of an adversarial model is as diverse
as each of the systems that call themselves adversarial.
My claim finds empirical support in the legal reality shown to
us by the reforms. The reform movement in Latin America reveals that
fifteen jurisdictions called their Codes adversarial. Notwithstanding,
the use of this category signified something different in every case. In-
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stead of focusing in abstract classifications to assess/evaluate legislations, we should analyze legislations as such, and observe what their
normative reality teaches us.
What was this reform about? We would expect to find, following all the authors cited, fifteen homogeneous Codes that unite all the
typical adversarial ideals, completely replacing old inquisitorial Codes.
After the analysis undertaken in the last chapter, we can see this is
not the case. The normative result of the reform movement exposes a
different reality.
Codes share a number of features, but few of those features are
a direct consequence of adversarial reform. In general, when we find in
the new Codes common traits, no typical adversarial values are present (i.e. victim's rights). In fact, such traits, in many cases, existed in
the region even before the reform era. Furthermore, some of the
shared features across the region, after the reform era, are proper of
inquisitorial models, or are at least, openly contradictory of ideals advertised by commentators as accusatory (i.e., mandatory written file of
the proceedings). Additionally, "typical distinctive adversary features"-classified as such according to commentators-are sometimes
absent in the reformed legislations (i.e., lay adjudicators, cross-examination). When any of those features do exist at least in some jurisdictions in the region they are not universal, meaning, they are not
present in all the Codes. Of course, in their general formulations, they
all adopt public/oral trials, but when one analyzes the concrete rules
that try to make such an abstract idea a reality, one can see that a
number of Codes are not in fact, according to this feature, adversarial.
I do not claim that the fifteen new Codes are completely different among each other. I only contend that where adversarial "ideals"
are to be found, the Codes are heterogonous. When accusatory values
are found in concrete rules, such as jury trials, they are not universally
embraced in the region. This means only some jurisdictions include
such rules. Therefore, when it comes to "adversarial" traits, the Codes
are, in general, heterogeneous. With the exception of prosecutorial discretion, there is not a single trait that is catalogued as adversarial
found in all the reformed Codes.
Codes are identical in certain abstract formulations. Thus, one
could argue some adversarial ideals are universally found in the reforms, at least in an abstract fashion. I have shown supra that abstract formulations of adversarial values may be easily discarded (i.e.
public/oral trials). If abstract formulations fully determined criminal
procedure rules, then not only would all the Codes in Latin America be
substantially similar, but also most procedural legislations in western
civilizations would be substantially similar. Does any Code assertively
deny human rights, a concern for efficiency, the rule of law, or the
truth-seeking function? Weren't public/oral trials introduced in conti-
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nental Europe more than 200 years ago with the Napoleonic Code?
Doesn't every western Code have a division between investigation and
adjudication with institutionally or normatively different actors in
charge of each phase? What matters in comparative criminal procedure are the concrete normative structures of the Codes, not the abstract formulations.
The lack of accusatorial similarity among the new Codes has a
simple explanation: all the reforms were diverse because they resulted
from different causes and received varied influences. It would be impossible to fit, under abstract categories, such dissimilar reform undertakings in a multiplicity of jurisdictions with important legal,
historical, social, and cultural differences.
Therefore, if we adopt the Latin American example to understand the adversarial/inquisitorial dichotomy, and if we use this lesson
in comparative criminal procedure, my conclusion seems plausible:
"adversarial" adapts to legislations in different manners. Each adversarial Code has a different normative design and diverse procedural
rules. Some come closer to adversarial abstract ideals, others are more
distant. The reform movement in the region teaches us that there is no
such thing as a pure adversarial model. Criminal Procedure Code reforms are concrete events and cannot be easily compared to fixed a
priori catalogues of traits. What is adversarial can be said to mean
very different things.
After witnessing the Latin American reforms, another possibility is to claim that there is no longer an adversarial/inquisitorial dichotomy because one can no longer hold such categories exist.
Perhaps, we are left with legislations resulting from multiple causes
and diverse influences, with no adequate fit in any type of category.
We are witnessing the birth of systems embodying unique normative
combinations that constitute independent experiments and realities.
2.2.

Prosecutorialdiscretion

An important question remains. Can we find any common denominator in the region as a direct result of the reforms? Is there a
shared feature in Latin America incorporated as a consequence of the
adversarial movement? Or, are all the Codes completely dissimilar,
and in fact, have nothing in common when it comes to "adversarial
ideals"?
I claim we can identify two universal traits adopted in every
jurisdiction in Latin America as a direct consequence of the adversarial reform movement: judicial review of investigative acts that restrict fundamental rights and prosecutorial discretion.
Let's focus then, on one of the only two universal features that
can be homogenously found in every Latin America jurisdiction:
prosecutorial discretion. The reason for this choice is that even though
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judicial review is now common in the region, it does not appear listed
in the catalogue of adversarial traits constructed by mainstream commentators as something "typically adversarial." Furthermore, the creation of judicial review is to some extent deceitful. Fundamental rights
have long been subject in the region to restriction only with judicial
intervention. What used to happen is that prosecutors-or whoever
was assigned the prosecutorial duty-had judicial functions. Now, judicial functions, that is, decisions that affect fundamental rights, are
segregated and given to independent officials.
Therefore prosecutorial discretion is the only new adversarial
trait commonly found in all Latin American jurisdictions. I have no
intention of holding that "adversarial" means, within the region,
prosecutorial discretion. Such a claim would fall under the same effort
of abstract definition, classification, and categorization undertaken by
other authors, which I previously criticized. If that were my claim then
future reforms could only be judged as "adversarial" if they included
prosecutorial discretion, and without which, we could discard them as
inquisitorial. I simply intend to show that the only new common concern in the region, after the reform, is prosecutorial discretion. My
claim is empirical. Looking at the reality of criminal procedure in the
region, prosecutorial discretion appears as the only universal trait.
What jurisdiction, if any, inspired discretion in the region?
3.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN LATIN AMERICA

We have identified discretion of the prosecutorial body, as the
main-and practically the only-universal trait of Latin American
criminal procedure reform. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
origin of prosecutorial discretion in the region. Where did it first
appear?
3.1.

The 1986 Draft

For the first time in the history of Latin American criminal
procedure, prosecutorial discretion appeared in the Argentinean 1986
Criminal Procedure Code Draft.2 3 After this initial appearance, discretion was included in the Model Ibero-American Code, and subsequently in the rest of the new Codes.2 3 9 Why was it included in the
1986 Draft?
238 See Draft, supra note 190.
239 M.C., supra note 149, ch.3. See generally, C.P.P.Panama,supra note 192, art.
464; C.P.P. Paraguay,supra note 167, art. 420; C.P.P. El Salvador, supra note
149, art. 379; C.P.P. Costa Rica, supra note 167, art. 373; C.P.P. Honduras,supra
note 149, art. 373; C.P.P. Chile, supra note 192, art. 406; C.P.P.Dominican Republic, supra note 192, arts. 363, 366; C.P.P. Venezuela, supra note 183, art. 391.
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In 1983, Argentina overcame the dictatorial regime it endured
for decades, causing the return to a constitutional democracy. 240 This
new environment of respect for democratic values and liberties incentivized the desire of reforming the criminal justice system at a federal
level. After the end of the dictatorship period, the newly elected President of Argentina was motivated to promote reforms. The government
appointed Professor Maier as head of the group in charge of drafting
the Criminal Procedure Code project.2" 1 He had been a student of Professor V6lez.2 4 2 It is important to highlight that Professor Maier had
studied in Germany.2 4 3
Argentina, at least at its Federal level, had an inquisitorial
model of criminal procedure which burdened the system with human
rights issues and constitutional violations. The criminal justice situation in Argentina's Federal level was catalogued as inefficient, nontransparent, non-reliable, and without sufficient due process.2 44 Professor Maier intended to draft an accusatory code. The new Code was
drafted in 1986. Professor Maier found inspiration for the preparation
of the Code in the C6rdoba Code of 1939 and the documents that had
been drafted over previous years for the Model Code.2 45
However, the other major source was the German criminal procedure code Strafprozessordnung (StPO) which
contained many of the main ideas for his project. Maier
did not simply duplicate the ideas presented in his
sources; rather he was careful to critically examine them
and translate them into political and legal principles
that met his standards and fit Argentina's reality.2 46
Maier severely criticized the inquisitorial procedure scheme.
He endorsed public/oral trials, more rights for defendants in the pretrial phase, a reform of preventive detention, and he followed Germany
with respect to having "mixed" bodies of adjudicators including both
professional and lay decision-makers.2 4 7 Professor Maier also condemned the Argentinian Federal Code of 1888 and the C6rdoba Code
of 1940 for
lacking the flexibility necessary for an efficient criminal
justice system. The rule of compulsory prosecution did
History of Argentina, HISTORY OF NATIONS, http://www.historyofnations.net/
southamerica/argentina.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014).
241 See Langer, supra note 24, at 637.
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not allow investigating officials to concentrate on important cases and dismiss less serious ones. In addition,
Maier thought that requiring a trial to adjudicate every
minor offense was an unnecessary waste of resources. As
a result, the Draft of 1986 included a number of mechanisms designed to relieve the criminal justice system of
minor cases and allow cases to be processed more
quickly. Inspired again by the German StPO-instead of
the U.S. principle of almost unlimited prosecutorial discretion-the Draft employed the opportunity principle
provided for the use of diversion mechanisms and contained a plea-bargaining-like mechanism for minor
offenses.2 4 8
For the purpose of this paper, this is perhaps the most important moment in the history of the Reform Era. Prosecutorial discretion
appeared in the region under the rubric of the "opportunity principle."
Thus, the opportunity principle is the statutory name of prosecutorial
discretion and it was first introduced in Latin America with the Criminal Procedure Code Project for Argentina's Federal level. 2 49 Its introduction responded to the drafter's yearning for "the necessary
flexibility for an efficient criminal justice system."25 0 Thus,
prosecutorial discretion was understood, at least in its origins, within
the Latin American context, as a necessary mechanism for allowing
law enforcement officials to select where to concentrate their efforts.
Concentrating efforts would, hence, provide flexibility. Without flexibility the criminal justice system would fail to be efficient. The 1986
Draft, therefore, included prosecutorial discretion, as a "mechanism of
relief' for the burdensome pressure that compulsory prosecution exerted upon the criminal justice system's resources. 25 1 The German
"version" of prosecutorial discretion-the opportunity principle-was
selected over the U.S. version.25 2
Unfortunately the project was never passed by the legislature.
This situation prompted Professor Maier, with the help of Professor
Binder, to finish drafting the text of the Model Code. Hence, the failed
Criminal Procedure Code Project for Argentina shared several similarities with the Model Code.2" 3 In 1991 a Code was passed in Argentina
for the Federal level, and incorporated only some of the ideas advanced
248
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by the 1986 Draft.2 5 4 In 1992, the Province of C6rdoba, under the leadership of its Justice Minister, Jos6 Cafferata Nores, reformed its criminal procedure legislation based too on the Draft.2 55 Subsequent
reforms of Argentina's federal criminal
procedure laws have included
256
more features of the 1986 Draft.
Likewise, other commentators in the region also accept that no
system is capable of processing and giving exactly the same full treatment-investigation and trial-to every single offense.2 5 7 Limited resources and case overload, with no discretion, would make judicial
systems collapse. Not every case can get and furthermore does not deserve, the same treatment.
Prosecutorial discretion is a reality, as well
2 58
as a pragmatic necessity.
In conclusion, one can observe that the specific purpose of
prosecutorial discretion in Argentina was to generate a more "efficient" process. Additionally, the German version of prosecutorial discretion was purposefully selected over the American version.2 59
Furthermore, the text of the 1986 Draft contains marginal comments
with references to the concrete normative sources of inspiration used
by the drafters.2 6 0 The specific legal influence for prosecutorial discretion-as it expressly appears in the marginal notes of the Draft-is
contained in Articles 152 and 153 of the German Criminal Procedure
Code.2 6 1 It is unclear, however, why Argentina chose the German system. Why did Argentinean drafters prefer a European version of a procedural trait invented, practiced, exercised, and historically applied
exclusively by the Anglo-American tradition of criminal procedure?
See Langer, supra note 24, at 641.
Id.
256 See Langer, supra note 24, at 641; see also id. at 641 n.116.
257 This paper does not pretend to assert that the exact motivation of every Latin
American reform, for introducing the opportunity principle, was efficiency. Jurisdictions may claim they had different independent motives. I refer to the "efficiency discourse" only to claim that it was the underlying philosophy of the
genealogy of the opportunity principle in the region. However, in the extensive
literature I have revised for this paper, no reference to other motivations appears
in any jurisdiction. Nonetheless it is conceivable that some countries adopted discretion not only as a result of pragmatic necessity but also, for example, to embrace the possibilities of restorative justice that discretionary powers provide. In
any event, even if necessity of efficiency was not the only motivation, for sure, in
every country, it played a central part.
258 See C~sar E. San Martin Castro, Informe Peru, in LAS REFORMAS PROCESALES
PENALES EN AMIERICA LATINA, supra note 41, at 669-70.
259 See Langer, supra note 24, at 640.
260 See Draft, supra note 190.
261 STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 1074, as amended, arts. 152, 153.
254
255
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The procedural device chosen in Germany's legislation to govern discretion-and therefore inherited in Latin America-is embodied in the so called "opportunity principle." This legal device generally
appears in the region in the company of a diversion mechanism called
"provisional suspension of proceedings." Both normative instruments
represent prosecutorial discretion, and thus, replace mandatory prosecution. In turn, prosecutors are allowed to exercise some selectivity,
which brings about efficient concentration of resources.
Mandatory prosecution was an absolute rule in every country
in the region, until that moment in history. It meant every offense had
to be prosecuted and given exactly the same procedural treatment. Descending to the concrete rules that finally appeared in the Draft, Article 230 incorporated the opportunity principle:
230. Opportunity. In the cases in which the law permits
the application of opportunity criteria to avoid promotion
of penal prosecution or to make it cease, the public ministry, through the official that the Law of Judicial Organization determines, will request dismissal to the
competent instruction judge, who will decide without further means of attacking such decision. The court may require the opinion of the public ministry about the issue,
when it considers it convenient.
Dismissal does not mean the definitive termination of
penal prosecution, which may by reinitiated by the public ministry when it considers it convenient, unless penal
26 2
law attaches other effects
Article 231 incorporated provisional suspension of proceedings:
231. Suspension of the process subject to conditions.
When penal law permits the suspension of penal prosecution, the monitory process (arts. 371 and ss.) will be
applied with the following modifications:
1) after hearing the defendant, the court will decide about the suspension of the proceedings, and
in case of conceding it, will specify concretely the
instructions and impositions to which the defendant shall submit;
2) on the contrary, it will order the process to continue, through the tracks that corresponds.
The resolution according to incise 1 will be notified to the defendant, always in his presence and by the
262 EL PROYECTO DE C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL DE LA NACION,

lated from Spanish).

supra note 9 (trans-
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judge, with express warning about the instructions and
impositions and the consequence of not observing them.
The execution Court will provide to the control
about the observance of the impositions and instructions,
for the purpose of which it will receive a copy of the resolution; it shall communicate any lack of observance to
the court that suspended the proceeding.
The decision is not subject to attack, except for
the defendant and the public ministry, when they hold
they have not given consent for the suspension of the
proceedings, or when the instructions or impositions are
illegitimate, in which case they can file an extraordinary
appeal.
In case of breach or lack of observance of the imposed conditions, impositions or instructions, the Court
will give a hearing possibility to the public ministry and
the defendant, and will resolve, with a motivated decision, about the reanimation of the penal prosecution. The
a summary investigation
decision may be preceded by 263
and it is not subject to attack
Though initially exercised by the prosecutor, discretion ultimately relies on judicial review. It is a narrowly construed discretion
with judicial review, which makes it in essence different from the
broad exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the Anglo-American tradition. The opportunity principle and the provisional suspension of proceedings, notwithstanding the concrete procedural particularities in
the draft-judicial approval and satisfaction of certain conditions, allow
criminal prosecutions to be interrupted, suspended, or terminated,
even though an offense has been actually committed. This revolutionary possibility left behind centuries of mandatory prosecution. Discretion means that criminal offenses can be dealt with differently and
that the prosecutorial body can weigh its response to each particular
event of criminality.
Finally, what is the difference between the opportunity principle and provisional suspension? In the Draft and within the rest of
Codes in the region, provisional suspension allows prosecutors to place
on hold the proceedings while defendants obey certain conditions,
which would lead subsequently, to the termination of the prosecution. 2 64 The opportunity principle may be applied to terminate or interrupt the prosecution directly, given the presence of certain legal
motivations or reasons.
263
264

Id. (translated from Spanish).
See Langer, supra note 24, at 640 n. 108.
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3.2.

A correct understanding of discretion in Latin America

It is important to understand exactly what was introduced in
the 1986 Draft, and later dispersed across the region. Prosecutorial
discretion under the 1986 Draft-and for that matter, under all the
rest of Latin American adversarial legislations-is a mechanism that
allows prosecutors to dismiss a case (i.e., refuse or avoid prosecution
by interrupting or suspending it), subject to judicial review. Therefore,
Latin American discretion is about dismissal of charges-or better, decisions not to charge-even though there is sufficient evidence to support bringing a case to trial. It is obvious that before or after the
reform, prosecutorial bodies cannot legitimately continue cases if they
don't have sufficient evidence to make a citizen stand trial. Decisions
to dismiss charges, when there is not sufficient evidence to show criminal responsibility, and thus to prove guilt at trial, have always been,
and will be, under the ambit of prosecutorial bodies.
The revolution in Latin America's adversarial legislations is
represented in the opportunity for prosecutors to avoid prosecution,
even though there would be enough evidence to successfully prosecute.
All jurisdictions still adopt as a general rule the "legality principle," or
mandatory prosecution, under which conducts that appear to be criminal must always be investigated.2 6 5 The opportunity principle, hence,
is included in the Codes as an exception allowing prosecutors, given
certain grounds-and the satisfaction of a number of legal requirements-to cease or suspend an investigation.2 6
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the introduction of
prosecutorial discretion in Latin America is that it had nothing to do
with plea-bargaining. The relationship between discretion and bargaining in the United States is extremely close. On the contrary, in
Latin America only a handful of countries adopted plea-bargaining.
Even in those jurisdictions with bargaining, like Colombia, discretion does not play a central role in the negotiation process. Prosecutors under Colombian law do not have discretion to select charges or
sentencing ranges in plea agreements. Therefore, they are stripped of
discretion in the plea-bargaining process.26 7
Likewise, the German model-as we will see infra-influential
over the 1986 Drafters, does not have discretion traditionally connected with plea bargaining. It is important to realize that
265 See Carlos Rios Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico's Criminal Procedure: The
States' Turning Point, 15 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 53, 72 (2008).
266 See id. at 71.
267 See generally, e.g., decisions of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of

Justice of Colombia: Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], octobre
20, 2005, Sentencia 24026; Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.l [Supreme Court],
abril 6, 2006, Sentencia 24668.
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prosecutorial discretion in Latin America, from its origins in the 1986
Draft to its regulation in every other Code in the region, has no rooted
association with plea-bargaining.
Discretion in Latin America, hence, is not about allowing prosecutors to negotiate benefits in exchange for waivers of rights, it is
about allowing prosecutors to cease or suspend investigations, given
certain legal requirements, even though there would be sufficient evidence to follow through with the proceedings.
3.3.

The rest of the Codes

The opportunity principle spread across the region. The small
table below summarizes in chronological order, each of the reform undertakings in the region, and references the concrete rules governing
discretion.
0j .
Prov.
Sp.
Normative body

Model Ibero-american Criminal Procedure Code - 1988

Prin.

Arts. 229
and 230
Arts. 25
And 2
and 286.

Art. 231

Criminal Procedure Code E Salvador - in effect since 1998

Art. 20

Art. 22

Criminal Procedure Code of Costa Rica - in effect since 1998
Criminal Procedure Code of Paraguay - in effect since 1999

Art. 22
Art. 19

Art. 25
Art. 21

Criminal Procedure Code of Venezuela - in full effect since
1999268

Art. 37

Art. 42

Criminal Procedure Code of Chile -gradual entry into effect
since 2000

Art. 170

Art. 237

Criminal Procedure Code of Bolivia - fully in effect since 2001

Art. 21

Art. 23

Criminal Procedure Code of Honduras - in effect since 2002

Art. 28

Art. 36

Criminal Procedure Code of Dominican Republic - in effect since
2004

Art 34

Art. 40

Criminal Procedure Code of Colombia - gradual entry into effect
since 2005

Ar. 321

Art. 325

Criminal Procedure Code of Peru - gradual entry into effect
since 2006

Art. 2.

Mexican Constitution. Amendments passed in 2008.

Art. 21

Art. 20 (c)
(VII)

Criminal Procedure Code of Panama - gradual entry into effect
since 2011

Art. 212.

A

Criminal Procedure Code of Guatemala - in effect since 1993

Arts. 27
And 27
and 287.
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268 It is important to note that two almost identical Codes were passed in
Venezuela with very little time difference. The first in 1998 by Congress and the
second in 2001 by the National Assembly. However, in their articles 501 and 516
respectively, the Code state that it will be in effect in 1999. It appears that the
"Code" passed in 2001 merely reformed some provisions of the 1998 statute, as a
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The table includes only the general opportunity principle
clause and the general provisional suspension provision. Each Code
has more than one article governing these procedural devices. Usually
the articles immediately following the ones highlighted in the table
have to do with the same subject matter. This table only shows the
general possibility of discretion, not the concrete governing procedural
rules in each jurisdiction.
If this table were to analyze in detail the rest of the rules and,
hence, each concrete normative design we would find differences regarding: A) Temporal limits within which discretion may be applied
during the proceedings; B) Reasons that can motivate the exercise of
discretion by prosecutors; C) Conditions that can be imposed during
the provisional suspension; D) Types of offenses in which discretion
can be applied; E) Different degrees of victim participation, and consideration or deference for its rights when discretion is exercised; F)
When and how prosecution can be reinitiated after discretion is applied. None of these differences affect the shared nature of
prosecutorial discretion in Latin America: prosecutors were granted
the chance to select cases. However, it is clear there is no "pure ideal
discretion" or a "universal conception" of discretion.
Discretion, in opposition to other "adversarial traits" is not an
abstract ideal, like public/oral trials. Discretion is itself a concrete normative feature with a common denominator in every jurisdiction, notwithstanding differences in regulation. The conclusion is simple:
prosecutorial discretion in the region follows the German model, even
though we can find differences among jurisdiction with respect to concrete procedural rules. Prosecutorial discretion in the region has two
distinct universal characteristics: it is statutorily regulated and it is
subject to strict/mandatory judicial review (it is a common denominator in the region that judges always have the last word in the application of discretion). In opposition to this model, one can find in other
countries with "adversarial" systems, broad discretion (not regulated
by any statute) with no judicial review.2 6 9 In Latin America, therefore,
prosecutorial discretion is legislatively delimited and structured, as
well as judicially controlled.
The purpose of this paper is not to compare in detail the legal
designs for which each country opted. Nor is its purpose to assess if
consequence of the political turmoil Venezuela endured during that time. In any
event, the Code received a major reform in 2012. For the purposes of this paper
our focus is placed on the Code passed during the time the adversarial reform
movement was taking place in Latin America.
269 See generally Erik J. Luna & Marianne Wade, ProsecutorialPower: A Transnational Symposium: Prosecutorsas Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 141819 (2010).
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broader or narrower schemes of discretion are more convenient from a
public policy standpoint. Other academic works may pursue these
objectives. The purpose of this paper is simply to show that
prosecutorial discretion is the only new universal trait resulting from
adversarial criminal reform in Latin America and to review its genealogy in the region.
Germany strongly influenced criminal procedure reform in
Latin America. The German version of the adversary process not only
inspired Latin America, but was fundamental, because adversarial
transformations in Central and East Europe were filtered through the
German reception of the adversary process.2 70
3.4.

German inspiration

The 1986 Drafters were influenced by German criminal procedure law, with respect to prosecutorial discretion. However, when one
analyzes German law, it is clear that Latin America did not just copy
or imitate. The 1986 Draft and all the rest of legislations in the region,
have several regulatory differences with German law. This paper will
not compare exactly the breadth of prosecutorial discretion in Germany with the exact terms in which the opportunity principle appeared-and was further reproduced-in the region. We need not to.
The point of this remains the same: prosecutorial discretion, notwithstanding concrete regulatory differences, as a procedural device for
granting prosecutors the choice of avoiding or suspending an investigation, was adopted from Germany.
The history of mandatory prosecution in Germany grows parallel to the creation of public prosecution. Germany's office of the public
prosecution was created in the middle of the nineteenth century with
27 1
the purpose of stripping inquisitorial judges of investigatory duties.
At the time, it was believed that combining investigatory and adjudicatory functions prejudiced the defendant.2 72 As a result, "[tihe responsibility for investigation on report or suspicion of crime was split
273
from the judicial office and made the job of the public prosecutor."
See Mirjan Damaska, Aspectos Globales de la Reforma del Proceso Penal
[Global Aspects of Criminal Procedure Reform] 4-5, http://enj.org/portal/biblioteca/
penal/derecho-procesal-penal/19.pdf (last visited April 20, 2013).
271 Eberhard Siegismund, Seminar, The PublicProsecution Office in Germany: Le270

gal Status, Functions and Organization, RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 60 58,
59, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), available at http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RSNo60/No6O-OOAll.pdf.
272 See John H. Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
439, 446 (1974)
273

r-
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Even though the prosecutorial power was separated from instruction
judges, the office of the public prosecutor remained a part of the judicial branch.2 74 In effect, "[t]he prosecutor.. . did not act as an administrator trying to attain practical goals. Instead, his function was limited
to the judicial task of applying the provisions of the Penal Code to the
facts of each case."27' 5 Since the creation of public prosecution,
mandatory prosecution was embraced under the philosophy of equal
enforcement of the law and protection against arbitrary prosecutorial
conduct. Despite some small changes, the German Criminal Procedure
Code has been in effect since 1877.276
Claus Roxin, one of the most important criminal law professors
in Germany, and one of the most influential European scholars in
Latin America, claims that the legality principle even today dominates
German law.2 7 7 Under said principle, the prosecution must investigate
offenses and accuse defendants when, after the investigation, there is
a strong suspicion of criminal responsibility.2 7' This principle is different than the opportunity principle. Under this principle the prosecution may refuse to bring a case to trial even though there is a strong
suspicion that the defendant is guilty.2 7 9
It is important to note that one of the socio-political and cultural origins of the legality principle in German law was, according to
Professor Roxin, mistrust in the prosecution. Mandatory and compulsory prosecution, embodied in the legality principle was introduced in
the German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) because the prosecution
was not trusted because prosecution was subordinate to the
Monarchy.2 s °
The underlying philosophy of compulsory prosecution was that
justice should be absolute. Therefore every offense should be punished
equally and without exception. With time, punitive philosophies based
on prevention, social necessity, and convenience have weakened the
legality principle's reputation. Notwithstanding, it is still widely recognized and applied because democracy and the Rule of Law demand
28 1
certainty and equality.
274

See Joachim Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of

ProsecutorialDiscretionin Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468, 469-70 (1974).
275 Id. at 469-70; see generally MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55-57, 108-113 (2012).
276 Herrmann, supra note 274, at 469-470.
277 CLAUS ROXIN, DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL

Puerto ed., 2003).
278 Id. at 89.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id.

[Criminal Procedure Law] 77 (Del
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It is important to understand that the prosecutorial body in
Germany is neutral and thus must investigate charging evidence as
well as exculpatory evidence.2 S2 This means the investigation is "integral." Police forces and the prosecution work closely in Germany to secure sufficient evidence for a conviction. Lack of satisfactory levels of
evidence will result in a dismissal of the case.2 8
Therefore, the general rule under the StPO is the principle of
legality. 2 4 Under Articles 152 and 170, the prosecution must investigate every conduct if there is suspicion about its criminal nature and
accuse the defendant if sufficient evidence is obtained.28 5 However,
this principle suffers a number of exceptions, especially with respect to
low and medium criminality.28 6 German criminal procedure law has at
least four categories under which investigations can be ceased or suspended, even though there would be sufficient evidence to follow
through with the case.2 8 7 It is important to note that discretion is applied precisely when there is enough evidence to support a prosecution.
If there is deficient
evidence, an application of regular dismissal pow28 8
ers will suffice.
First, the opportunity principle may be applied when an offense is "insignificant" and there is no interest in prosecution; second,
when the prosecutorial interest may be satisfied through other means;
third, when prosecutorial interests find opposition in national interests; fourth, when the victim can carry out on his own the
prosecutorial efforts. 2 9 Article 153 allows imposing conditions on defendants, conditions that if satisfied can preclude the prosecution.2 9 °
Some American scholars have claimed that German law adopts even
more forms of prosecutorial discretion.2 9 1
We can extract two highly provocative conclusions after this
very brief and superficial summary of the opportunity principle in Germany. First, plea-bargaining, though it exists for some cases, is not
282 JULIA FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION

A

COMPARATIVE STUDY

133 (1995).
283 Id. at 135.
284 TERESA ARMENTA DEU,

CRIMINALIDAD DE BAGATELA Y PRINCIPIO DE OPOR-

[Small Criminality and the Opportunity Principle:
Germany and Spain] 43-47 (2001).
285 ROXIN, supra note 277, at 90.
286 ARMENTA DEU, supra note 284, at 43.
287 ROXIN, supra note 277, at 90.
288 FIONDA, supra note 282, at 135-39.
289 ROXIN, supra note 277, at 90-91.
290 Id. at 92.
291 Herrmann, supra note 274, at 475-502.
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29 2
part of the discourse regarding prosecutorial discretion in Germany.
This means that in Germany, plea-bargaining is not institutionally,
legally, and culturally associated with discretion.2 9 3 Second, though
the 1986 drafters based the inclusion of prosecutorial discretion on
German law, the structure and the concrete regulation of the opportunity principle and the conditional suspension of proceedings in the
Draft does not mimic German legislation. Furthermore, no code in the
region does.
Actually, as we have mentioned, though all the new legislation
stems from the same reform effort and from the same set of comparative, doctrinal, and normative influences. Among them we can find
several differences with respect to the concrete regulation of
discretion.
In any event, the German version of the opportunity principle-as a legislative embodiment of prosecutorial discretion-was determinative of the genealogy of discretion in Latin America, and,
notwithstanding concrete differences, it has spread across all the reforms undertaken over the past decades. Its essence is simple and
clear: prosecutors can refuse to try a case subject to a regulated judicial review and with the fulfillment of certain statutory elements or
grounds.

3.5. Germany and the Anglo-American traditionfrom a comparative
criminaljustice perspective
It is interesting to analyze at least part of the literature produced, with respect to German procedural law, in a comparative perspective. Within comparative criminal procedure literature, German
law and the Anglo-American tradition have been repeatedly evaluated.
From a comparative criminal justice perspective, a traditional
category used to distinguish models of criminal procedure is embodied
in the opportunity/legality dichotomy. Models based on mandatory or
compulsory prosecution are governed by the legality principle. Under
this principle the prosecutor has a restricted decision-making freedom.

See ARMENTA DEU, supra note 284, at 43-138 (does not mention in her very
detailed history of discretion, an explanation of anything related to bargaining).
293 See FIONDA, supra note 282, at 141-45 (explaining penal orders. A penal order
is an abbreviated form of prosecutorial sentencing, but it is not a product of discretion. It is a document containing facts, offenses and the supporting evidence, with
a recommendation of sentence. A defendant can accept the order. Some could understand it as a form of plea bargain. In any event it has little to do with discretion
as such.).
292
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Nonetheless, some recognize certain elements of discretion within procedural models that adopt the legality principle.2 9 4
The opportunity or expediency principle, on the contrary, applies when a prosecutor convinced of criminal responsibility, nonetheless, avoids prosecution. In some jurisdictions, the prosecution must
have previous legally defined grounds to apply the principle of expediency or opportunity. In the Anglo-American tradition, prosecution can
be refused on pragmatic reasons, not necessarily defined previously by
statute.295
Focusing on the United States, we must say that prosecutorial
discretion is a debated topic. Prosecutors have to undertake complex
decision making processes. When deciding if they should charge, and
what to charge, they must assess a number of factors. 296 "Given the
complex nature of prosecutorial decision making, it is well recognized
that prosecutors must be afforded certain degree of discretion. '2 97 It
has been suggested that beyond the power of deciding whether or not
to charge-and what to charge-lies the power "not to prosecute further even in the face of sufficient evidence."2 98 Prosecutorial discretion
is nearly unlimited, even though there are some prohibitions regarding consideration of illegitimate grounds according to the Constitution.
Claims against improper prosecution, however, rarely succeed.2 9 9
Discretion, even though problematic, is a systematic necessity,
and advances the interests of justice. Thus, commentators are generally not concerned with the existence of discretion as such, but with
the improper exercise of broad discretion lacking supervision or
control.3 ° °
Discretion becomes a matter of concern for authors when they
consider its relation with plea-bargaining.30 1 Commentators have
identified several forms of "coercive" plea bargaining by American
See Mirjan Damaska, The Reality of ProsecutorialDiscretions:Comments on a
German Monograph, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 119, 120 (1981); Klaus Ludersen, Over294

view of Different Types of Procedurefrom a German Point of View! Arguments
Against the Inquisitorial Type of Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE BETWEEN CRIMINAL CONTROL AND DUE PROCESS. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN

20 (2004) (Germ.); see Herrmann, supra note 274,
at 472-73.
295 See Damaska, supra note 294, at 120.
296 See Yue Ma, Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining In The United
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS

States, France, Germany, And Italy: A Comparative Perspective, 12
JUST. REV. 22 (2002).
297

Id. at 22.

298

Id. at 25.

299

See id. at 29.
See id. at 22.

300

301 See id. at 28.
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prosecutors, such as overreaching, charging without probable cause,
filing multiple charges, and charging under penalty-enhancing statutes. Nevertheless, plea-bargaining "plays an important role in conserving the limited justice resources."3 °2 In any event, we must not
forget that even though the exercise of discretion to decide not to
charge may generally go unchecked, plea bargains are always subject
to judicial approval. Although judges have the authority to reject plea
30 3
agreements, rejection is a rare occurrence.
Within this complex legal and institutional environment some
U.S. scholars have turned to continental Europe in search of ideas for
restraining discretion and spoke with approval about earlier
mandatory prosecution models.30 4 While European legislators have
been gradually adopting several forms of prosecutorial discretion the
broad and unchecked nature of discretion in the United States remains unique in comparative criminal justice.30 5
Certain promoters of American reform, finding inspiration in
German law, rely specially on the principle of mandatory/compulsory
prosecution. Under this principle, ideally, all cases with sufficient evidentiary support should be prosecuted, allowing no space for discretion.30 6 However, as we have seen, German criminal procedure laws
lack prosecutorial discretion. 30 7 Therefore, it is clear that even Germany-a historically inquisitorial system with mandatory/compulsory
prosecution-adopted prosecutorial discretion.30 8 Currently the German criminal procedure system represents a mix of both principles,
but the legality principle, and thus compulsory prosecution, still
prevails.3 0 9 Mandatory prosecution has weakened over the years.
However, German discretion is limited when compared to American
prosecutorial activity. 3 10 For various reasons, commentators suggest
that discretion in "non-minor criminal cases remains limited." 1
In conclusion, as we have seen, Germany, like the U.S. has empowered prosecutors with at least some discretionary power. Neither
the German nor the U.S. systems are efficient enough to prosecute all
See id. at 26-43.
William Pizzi, UnderstandingProsecutorialDiscretion in the United States:
The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform 54
Ohio St. L.J. 1325, 1356 (1993).
304 See Yue Ma, supra note 296, at 23.
305 See id. at 24.
306 See id. at 35.
307 Id.
308 See Fionda, supra note 282, at 167.
309 See Damaska, supra note 294, at 120-22.
310 See Pizzi, supra note 303, at 1332-33.
302
303

311 Id.
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crimes. However, Germans have articulated some rigorous factors to
select cases.3 1 2
Furthermore, some authors claim Germany has also implemented plea-bargaining. Since 1970 Germany witnessed a severe rise
313
In
in plea bargaining, eventually making it a prevalent practice.
several respects, German plea bargaining differs from plea bargaining
in the United States. 31 4 However, this is not a peaceful issue. Other
authors assert that Germany has purposefully avoided plea-bargaining.3 15 Professor Langbein in particular, argues that absence of barof the most acute differences with
gaining in Germany represents one
3 16
the U.S. criminal justice system.
In essence one could assert that it is the notion of "supervised
discretion" within German law which seems appealing to comparative
criminal justice academics. 3 17 Judges have controlling power of charging decisions. 3 18 On the contrary, prosecutorial discretion in the American system is rooted in the separation of powers. Within that
institutional framework, judicial review presents a number of
complications. 31
Under European inspiration, some scholars advancing American reform also suggest lowering penalties and granting broader pretrial discovery rights.3 2 ° High penalties, in comparison to the
punishment imposed in Germany and other European jurisdictions for
why prosecusimilar offenses, have been considered one of the3 2reasons
1
tors need more discretion in the United States.
We must also bear in mind that some authors are skeptical of
using discretion found in civil law models of criminal procedure as a
source of inspiration for reforms in America.3 22 Parallel to these considerations, some scholars consider that the American legal system
312
313

See Langbein, supra note 272, at 467.
See Yue Ma, supra note 296, at 36; Thomas Weigend, The Decay of the Inquisi-

torial Ideal: Plea BargainingInvades German CriminalProcedure,in

CRIME, PRO-

CEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT. ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN DAMAsKA 39-64 ( John Jackson et al. eds. 2008).
314 Yue Ma, supra note 296, at 38.

See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining:How The Germans Do
It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 205-213.
316 See id. at 205.
317 Yue Ma, supra note 296, at 42; see Langbein, supra note 272, at 439.
318 See Pizzi, supra note 303, at 1353.
315

319 See id. at 1354.
320 See Yue Ma, supra note

296, at 44-49 (claiming that in continental Europe, one
can find lower penalties, broader pretrial discovery rights, and judicial
supervision).
321 See Pizzi, supra note 303, at 1340; Herrmann, supra note 274, at 473.
322 See Pizzi, supra note 303, at 1373.
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does impose controls over prosecutorial discretion.3 2 3 Nevertheless,
such controls are informal, whereas, civil law models usually opt for
hierarchical and formal controls.3 24
One issue rarely mentioned in literature about comparative
criminal procedure and German law, is the one related to normative
influences over Germany. This is perhaps the most fascinating topic
for the purposes of this paper. If the origin of discretion in Latin
America was influenced by Germany, then one should ask if Germany,
in turn, found inspiration in any other legislation. Did Germany adopt
prosecutorial discretion autonomously and without any influence from
other jurisdictions or procedural models? Does Germany have its own
version of discretion as a product of its independent legal evolution,
without regard to values promoted by countries with other criminal
justice traditions?
This is a very difficult question to answer. It cannot, of course,
be fully answered in this paper. Texts about German criminal procedure history strongly suggest that discretion was just a product of Germany's own legal evolution. 32 5 It was an autonomous response to
Germany's judicial needs, resulting from an intuitive debate among
statute drafters and academics.
Among the scarce comments one can find regarding this matter, another theory emerges. Professor Damaska advances an alternative-and very reasonable-insightful claim. According to Professor
Damaska every criminal procedure structure suffers pressures for
change.32 6 These pressures, then, are sources of transformation. Pressures can be pragmatic or ideological.3 2 7 Pragmatic pressures are generally related to limited resources in the justice system. Ideological
pressures are associated with respect of human rights. 3 28 The human
rights discourse has acquired great rhetorical force recently, so it has
become a strong pressure for change over judicial structures.3 2 9
Following Damaska, Anglo-American procedural models-particularly the U.S. justice system-suffered pressures for which no apparent solutions were offered in continental Europe. 33 0 Pragmatic
pressures in the U.S., therefore, were met with alternatives coming
from within its own rationale, history, and legal tradition: an increase
in the use of prosecutorial discretion, plea-bargaining, and in general
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330

See id. at 1337-38.
See id. at 1337-50.
See generally Armenta Deu, supra note 284.
See Damaska, supra note 270, at 1-10.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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methods for avoiding trial (i.e., terminating proceedings in anticipation of the trial phase).3 3 1 The United States already had discretion
and bargaining, so it simply faced the challenges it was experiencing,
by increasing, and even refining, the use of common and ordinary long
existing mechanisms.
The United States suffered sharp pragmatic pressures. High
criminal rates and the elevated costs of full blown criminal prosecutions ending up in complete trials, strained the system. Mechanisms
already in place within the American legal culture, designed to avoid
trial, began to be more widely applied.3 3 2 The result was, and is, that
jury trials are the exception because the majority of cases are decided
through guilty pleas and bargaining, and in general, through the exercise of discretion. For solving these types of pressures, there was nothing that jurisdictions within the Anglo-American tradition could learn
from rigid civil law/inquisitorial models."'
Ideological pressures-resulting among others, from racial injustices-were dealt with by broadening and strengthening constitutional interpretation of procedural guarantees.3 3 4 In contrast, the
pressures countries in Europe suffered led them to look for answers
outside their own tradition and procedural rationale. Europe was
forced to search for solutions in the U.S. Within their own institutional
and legal history, Europeans found no tools for successfully confronting pragmatic and ideological pressures. 33 5 This, for example, explains the Italian criminal procedure reform of 1988. Ideological
pressures relating to respect for human rights led Europe to adopt
ideas embraced and promoted by procedural systems which had historically incorporated a methodical protection scheme of substantive
guarantees (e.g., right to counsel, impartial judges, due process, etc.);
mainly, the adversary process. 33 6 Pragmatic pressures were faced by
imitating prosecutorial discretion.
Therefore, the opportunity principle is the European version of
Anglo-American discretion, "invented" as a consequence of the necessity to find in foreign legal traditions what traditional European rationales did not offer: instruments to deal with disturbing resource
shortcomings.3 3 7
Damaska claims that the movement of ideas between the two
main procedural cultures (i.e., the Anglo-American adversary process
331
332

333
334
335
336
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and the Continental European inquisitorial model) has been almost
entirely unidirectional.3 38 Common law institutions have exerted a robust influence over civil law jurisdictions. 3 39 Nonetheless, almost no
movement can be observed in the other direction. 34 0 Anglo-American
criminal procedure models have historically developed free from foreign influences, however, European systems over the past two centuries have been adopting procedural institutions whose origin can only
be traced to the adversarial process.34 1 This is a difficult claim to support because, as Professor Damaska acknowledges, Europe has not always openly recognized this flow of normative incorporation, and
because the origin of legal reforms in Europe is not in general easily
discoverable since Europeans surround the imported institutions with
a number of variations.3 4 2
In opposition to Professor Damaska's claim, Professor
Langbein suggests that systemic pressures in Europe brought by case
overload led to reforms that "preserved the trial."3 4 3 Therefore, in his
opinion, no discretion was implemented because the jury trial retained
its character as a summary proceeding.3 4 4
3.6.

Prosecutorialdiscretion in the Anglo-American tradition

If we follow Damaska's claim about prosecutorial discretion in
Germany and continental Europe, we must explore, at least superficially, the Anglo-American tradition of criminal procedure. Retracing
our steps, thus far, this paper has shown that the origin of
prosecutorial discretion in Latin America can be found in the normative influence exerted by Germany. If we credit Professor Damaska,
and believe discretion in Europe was imported/adopted from the Anglo-American tradition, then the logical step-if one wants to continue
discovering the genealogy of discretion in Latin America-is to try to
understand the origins of discretion in the Anglo-American tradition of
criminal justice.
Discretion and plea bargaining in the United States have been,
without a doubt, among the most debated topics in criminal procedure.
338

See id. at 3.

339 Id.

See id. at 2.
See id. at 4.
342 See id.
343 John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining 13
LAW & Soc'y REV. 261, 261 -270 (1979) (explaining that the U.S. and continental
Europe endured the same pressures, but those pressures led in continental Europe to reforms that preserved trial. Therefore, Professor Langbein holds that
Europeans did not develop plea bargaining while their jury trial retained its character as a summary proceeding.).
344 See id.
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This paper, of course, does not pretend to recreate every discussion
and it does not aspire to present a full picture of these issues. We will
focus on the history of discretion and bargaining through some brief
references to a small part of the academic literature produced with
respect to these matters. Mainly, there are three interlocked factors
that ought to be considered when inquiring about the origins of discretion in the United States: the heritage left by common practices in
early private prosecutions, the increase in the use of plea-bargaining,
and the loss of efficiency of jury trials. These factors are deeply related
to one another and they overlap historically and systemically.
Historically, with respect to the influence of early private prosecutions in the development of U.S. criminal procedure, according to
Professor Langbein:
The common law's concept of the prosecutorial
function formed over centuries of predominantly private
or citizen prosecution. Official or public prosecution initially developed as an adjunct to private prosecution and
was steeped in the forms of private prosecution, as it continues to be in England today. Those forms helped conceal the development of the professional public
prosecutor in America. By the time the American prosecutor's monopoly could be perceived, new factors were
operating that seemed to require expansive prosecutorial
discretion the changes in the law of criminal procedure
and evidence that brought about the need for plea bargaining ... The public prosecutor at common law thus
grew up in the shoes of the old citizen prosecutor, occasionally displacing or supplementing him, but more usually deferring to him 34 5 . . . The tradition of private
prosecution has been a feature of English criminal procedure as nearly as striking and tenacious as jury trials...
Although the English did place some limits upon the
power of the prosecutor to compromise criminal litigation, the prosecutorial function nevertheless grew up
steeped in the conceptual forms of private discretion as
opposed to official duty. Even in America, where the public prosecutor has a longer history than in the mother jurisdiction, the district attorney fell heir to the discretion
of the citizen prosecutor whom he succeeded.3 4 6
Therefore, prosecutorial discretion can be explained with reference to the function of public prosecution. Public prosecution stemmed
from private prosecution, where discretion operated pervasively. In
345 Langbein, supra note 272, at 443-44.
346

Langbein, supra note 343, at 266-67.
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other words, discretion in the Anglo-American system can be understood as a consequence of a long tradition of private enforcement of the
law, in which it was widely practiced.
Management of enforcement efforts by professional and public
prosecutorial bodies became the general rule, only until recently.3 4 7
Private criminal litigation-carried out by victims or their familieswas substantial in the beginning of the nineteenth century. 3 48 For
multiple reasons, public prosecutors and professional police depart34 9
ments began to spread within England and the Unites States.
Secondly, it is also important to highlight that some commentators trace the evolution of discretion in close relation with bargaining. Thus, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, discretion and
bargaining need to be understood together because they are closely
connected. Professor Langbein further explains that bargaining was
unknown until the nineteenth century, when jury trials were considerably efficient. "It should surprise no one that in a system of trial as
rough and rapid as this there was no particular pressure to develop
non-trial procedure, or otherwise to encourage the accused to waive his
right to jury trial.,,3 0 However, when jury trials became complicated
enterprises, with discretion already in place as a result of private prosecution, prosecutors and defendants were incentivized to negotiate
agreements. These plea bargains required prosecutors to give something up-charging less serious offenses or seeking favorable
sentences-in exchange for waivers of rights held by defendants, and
especially the opportunity to be tried before a jury. Prosecutors had
the power-the discretion-to make these concessions and give up
what was required to get defendants to relinquish their rights.
Authors assert that it is not uncommon to find, in comparative
criminal procedure, models that allow favorable punitive treatment if
defendants accept responsibility. 3 5 ' In turn, trials are usually reserved
for a minority of cases, cases in which defendants contest the charges
brought by the state. 352 Therefore, one could argue that encouragement to accept guilt in exchange for lenient punishment, and a strucSee RONALD JAY ALLEN ET. AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 961 (3rd
ed. 2011) (explaining that, for multiple reasons, private prosecutors gave way to
public prosecutors. Also holding that movements of crime victims over the last two
decades are a result of displacement of private interests from the prosecution.).
348 See id. at 961.
349 See id.
350 Langbein, supra note 343, at 264-67.
351 See Langbein, supra 315, at 214.
352 See ALLEN, supra note 347, at 1231 (explaining that the difference between
American bargains and methods in other jurisdictions for terminating proceedings
is the "contract like manner" in which defendants are led to waive their rights in
exchange for favorable treatment).
347
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tural trend to preserve resources, is universal. 3 ' The distinguishing
characteristic of the U.S. system, thus, would be the "contract like
manner" of negotiations between prosecutors and defendants directed
punitive benefits in exchange for abdication of trial
at securing
35 4
rights.
Professor Fisher explains that the triumph of plea bargaining
in some parts of the U.S. was a consequence of removing discretion
from judges during the 19th century. The legislature set fixed penal55
ties for some offenses, driving discretion from judges to prosecutors.
I consider this a very important argument for the purposes of this paper. It shows that prosecutors began exercising more extensively discretion precisely because they already had discretion. No discretion
could have shifted towards them if they already did not have the systematically imbedded possibility of exercising discretionary powers.
Professor Fisher also explains the birth of "on file plea bargaining": a discretionary power used during the 19th century. This power
allowed prosecutors to suspend proceedings-and avoid trials-pending that the defendant respected certain obligations.3 5 6 I claim this is
a precursor of provisional suspension in the European and Latin
American contexts: charges can be dropped if the defendant first satisfies some obligations. Nonetheless, "on file pleas" were originally used
when judges were going to deny plea agreements.
Therefore, we can observe that discretion in the U.S. criminal
procedure tradition is not just about dismissing charges, even though
successful prosecutions could be carried out. It is also about exercising
the discretionary power to decide what to charge and what punishment to seek, in exchange for a compromise by the defendant to sacrifice its trial rights and enjoy a lesser punishment. Discretion, in plea
bargaining, is materialized in the power to negotiate. In Latin America
and Europe where plea bargaining has not evolved, or in some cases, is
not even allowed, prosecutors lack the power to negotiate offenses or
sentences, and thus, discretion has a different dimension. Latin American discretion is about dismissal of charges. It has nothing to do with
selecting charges, recommending sentences, or bargaining. On the contrary, the only way to understand the crisis of-and the criticisms toprosecutorial discretion in the United States is by grasping its strong
connection with bargaining. Discretion as such can only be comprehended within the evolution of plea bargaining, and plea bargaining is
only explicable as an outgrowth of discretion. Discretion and plea bargaining are intertwined. Within the U.S., prosecutorial discretion, as
353 See id. at 1231.
354 See id. at 1231.
355 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining'sTriumph, 109
356 See id. at 864-68.
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the power to refuse prosecution-independently considered-does not
appear to be a central concern.
Third, with respect to the relationship between loss of efficiency of jury trials and discretion, some authors claim that as a result
of a number of factors, jury trials became long and complicated undertakings.3 5 7 Consequently, jury trials ceased to be the ordinary general
rule type of procedure. While the system drifted away from jury trials
to preserve resources, prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining
35 8
evolved naturally and rapidly spread as a common practice.
When, therefore, the transformation of jury trial left the
trial system clogged, the pressure of caseloads could find
release in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion much
more naturally than on the Continent, where the
prosecutorial function has for so long been performed by
officials and where there has been constant concern to
regulate their discretion.3 59
Today, in the United States, prosecutorial discretion and plea
bargaining constitute accepted and pervasive practices, recognized
and protected by Supreme Court doctrine. Prosecutors decide whether
to file charges and what charges to file. 6 ° Also, lack of judicial review
has been upheld by Supreme Court opinions, among other reasons, as
36 1
a consequence of the separation of powers doctrine.
One can conclude, therefore, that discretion is imbedded in the
system. The adversary process evolved-for a number of reasons-into
a model that commonly applies discretion. Thus, we have seen that
discretion is congruent with the history of Anglo-American criminal
procedure. Historically, it seems "natural" that discretion and bargaining were born in the accusatory system. As a response to its own systemic needs and its own tradition, discretion began to be consistently
practiced.
Hence, at least historically, Professor Damaska's claim seems
plausible. Anglo-American models gave birth to discretion because
they evolved towards it, within their own rationales, responding to
357 See Langbein supra note 343, at 263-64.

358 See also Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand its History, 13 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 211 (1979); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargainingin Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & Soc'y REV. 247 (1979).
359 Langbein, supra note 343, at 261-67.
360 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
361 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (arguing that lack
of judicial review over prosecutorial discretion has to do with separation of powers); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); Inmates of Attica Corr.
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
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their own particular necessities, and as a consequence of their own
history stemming from private prosecution, plea-bargaining, and complicated jury trials. Once discretionary mechanisms were in place, and
imbedded in the system itself, logically, pragmatic pressures led to an
expansion of their use. On the contrary, it does not appear consistent
with European history for discretion to be have been born there. Discretion had no natural way of arising in civil law/inquisitorial models,
simply because it was an idea foreign to their values: they were never
governed by private prosecution, they never negotiated waivers of
rights, and trials were never perceived as inefficient.
If no disposition of private criminal prosecution was predominantly exercised, but rather, prosecution was an official and public
duty, then discretion could not have possibly been a systemic outcome-or a response to pragmatic necessities-in continental Europe.
So, it is possible that Damaska is correct when he claims that discretion was imported to Europe from the Anglo-American tradition.
If this is the case, Latin America ended up importing the
main-and only-universal trait of adversarial reforms, from a criminal procedure code (Germany) that found inspiration in the AngloAmerican tradition. Latin America, instead of looking for inspiration
in a model that naturally and systemically practiced and embraced
discretion, imitated the European version of it.
3.7.

What is discretion?

Thus far we have tried to understand the genealogy of
prosecutorial discretion in Latin America. Discretion in Latin America
ultimately comes from the Anglo-American tradition of criminal procedure. Notwithstanding differences in the exercise of discretion, its regulation, and its pervasiveness in Anglo-American and Continental
European/Latin American systems, I offer an understanding of
discretion.
Discretion means trust. Why else would a system give discretionary powers to an actor in the proceedings? Discretion is given because systems-for historical, social, political, cultural, or economic
reasons-trust some of the actors in the criminal justice context. Who
to entrust with the power of discretion is the question systems face. An
even greater question is the one related to supervisory controls over
the exercise of discretion. Who controls the discretion others exercise?
Trust, as many other issues in legal design, is a matter of degree. Actors may have broad or narrow spaces for discretion in different stages of the proceedings. Some manifestations of discretion may
not be recognized at all by the law, and they may be informal. I am
particularly interested in the legal or institutional dimension of trust.
In the Latin American context, is there any way in which we
can try to identify who is institutionally trusted? I claim there is a
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way. All Constitutions in Latin America contain a clause that demonstrates the level of trust in public officials.36 2
All the Latin American Constitutions-where adversarial reforms have taken place-include a clause under which private citizens
can do anything the law does not forbid, whereas public officials can
only do what is expressly allowed by law.36 3 The relationship between
public officials and the law is closed: they can only act according to the
duties they have been specifically and expressly entrusted to perform.
Therefore officials are bound to the strict text of the law in the execution of their functions. Private citizens hold an open relationship with
the law: they can undertake any action as long as the law does not
forbid it.
I believe these Constitutional clauses show an essential trait of
legal design in Latin America: public officials are institutionally and
systematically not trusted. Their conduct cannot fall outside the scope
strictly delimited by law. Hence, applied to the topic of prosecutorial
discretion, prosecutorial bodies could have never exercised discretion
unless the law expressly awarded that possibility.
The distribution of discretionary powers, and thus, the allocation of trust, responds-at least in part-to historical and institutional
necessities. This paper will not explore other possible causes for allocation of trust, such as political culture or social reasons.
As we have seen, in the Latin American context discretion was
a response to one fundamental need: efficiency. The idea that no system can adequately prosecute to the same extent every offense, underlines the genealogy of discretion in Latin America. To avoid the
collapse of systems as a result of case overload, discretionary mechanisms were put in place. Even in Germany, prosecutorial discretion
has increased as a solution to resource necessities. In fact, Professor
Fionda claims that prosecutors in Germany have become the central
The concepts of positive and negative relation to the law are common in administrative law literature within civil law systems. See generally FELIPE ROTONDO
362
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players in the criminal justice system. Their broad discretionary powers are a real-world need to process cases and prevent overload.3 6 4
Anglo-American criminal procedure history, as explained
supra, shows that discretion and bargaining evolved as an outcome of
the system's needs. Discretion was developed from within the own Anglo-American rationale. Discretion is so imbedded in the system that,
for example, in the U.S. it would be difficult to pinpoint a "rule" that
awards discretion to the Executive Branch. According to Article II,
Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution the Executive Branch "shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."3 6 5 Discretion is not specifically awarded in the Constitution or in the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prosecutorial offices in the federal and state levels rely
heavily on internal guidelines for the exercise of discretionary powers.3 66 On the contrary, discretion in Latin America is the product of
statutory reform. It is not common to find in U.S. criminal procedure
legislations closed lists of what prosecutorial bodies can do. These lists
are part of all Latin American criminal procedure Codes.
As an explanation for prosecutorial discretion in general, Professor Wiegned asserts that: "The criminal process cannot function
without a filter that prevents undeserving cases from advancing to
trial .. . [I]t is typically the prosecutor who is entrusted with sifting
out those cases that do not merit the attention of the court-a task
carried out adequately without measures of discretionthat cannot'3 be
67
ary power.
References to trust-or lack of trust-in criminal justice system design are not uncommon. Professor Herrmann asserts that broad
discretionary powers were "feared," among other reasons, because of
the risk that local enforcement officials would be politically influenced.36 8 Professor Pizzi suggests that the history of prosecutorial discretion in the United States is related to trust in local governmental
structures.369 Relaxation of mandatory prosecution in Germany, according to Professor Damaska, among other reasons, was a conse70
Hence, more
quence of the "increased legitimacy of prosecutors." 3
trust brings more power.
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4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have reviewed the criminal procedure reforms
fifteen Latin American countries undertook over the past two decades.
I showed that according to the mainstream discourse constructed by
leading scholars and commentators in the region, as a result of the
Reform Movement, systems with adversarial traits replaced inquisitorial models.
Nonetheless, it is clear that when one compares features categorized doctrinally as "adversarial" with the rules finally adopted in
the new fifteen legislations, one can hardly contend that Latin
America actually experienced an accusatorial revolution. Typical adversarial characteristics only appear in some of the new Codes. Thus,
"adversarial" in the context of Latin American comparative criminal
procedure, has many faces. Each jurisdiction understood differently
what it meant to reform inquisitorial models.
Furthermore, the comparative analysis exhibited in this paper
demonstrates that only one new feature appeared in all the Codes as a
consequence of the reforms. Prosecutorial discretion, previously unknown in the region, is now a shared characteristic in Latin American
post-reform criminal procedure.
This paper then explored prosecutorial discretion. I explained
how it was initially introduced in the region, by Argentinean reformers. Its genealogy can be traced even further, to German law. German
law, in turn, imitated discretion from the Anglo-American tradition,
where it was, and is now, widely applied. However, discretionary powers in the U.S. and in Latin America are different in one fundamental
aspect: Latin America does not connect discretion with pleabargaining.
Regardless, Latin America mirrored, in all its reforms, a procedural institution that had been in turn transplanted by Europeans
from outside the Continent. Consequently, the definitive trait of Latin
American criminal procedure reform was not directly adopted from the
Anglo-American legal tradition, the tradition that had systematically
and historically invented and practiced discretion. In fact, some authors have pointed out that, in general, German legal culture has defeated U.S. legal culture as the main source of influence over Latin
American normative design.37 1
The German-Latin American legislative version of prosecutorial discretion is called "the opportunity principle." One might consider
that adversarial systems in Latin America are to some degree tied to
James M. Cooper, Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform: The Battle of
Chile, 29 MicH. J. INT'L L. 501, 562 (2008).
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the opportunity principle.3 7 2 1 claim that according to the experience of
adversarial reform in Latin America, from a comparative criminal justice perspective, the only universal transformation was prosecutorial
discretion. Prior Codes were anchored in mandatory prosecution, I
suggest, as a consequence of normative absence of trust in public
officials.
Finally, this paper shows that the main problem with discretion is the review of its exercise. Notwithstanding the challenges of
supervising discretionary powers, it is uncontested by Latin American,
European, and U.S. commentators that it affords systemic efficiency.
My conclusion is that this brings attention to a consistent reality in Latin American procedures: the pressure of overload is a general
matter of concern. When the majority of the region had an opportunity
to "dramatically" revolutionize its procedural models, the only transformation homogenously embraced was providing prosecutors with at
least some discretionary power, abandoning centuries of mandatory
prosecution. Discretion is the only typical adversarial trait present in
all the reforms, precisely because it alleviates that which equally affects all the systems. Therefore, this paper allows that the central necessity of criminal procedure structures, at least in Latin America, is
dealing with the burden of caseload.
Discretion thus is the only one true unique conquest of the
Latin American Reform Movement. Jurisdictions should embrace this
transformation and extract from it all possible virtues. Maybe, within
discretionary powers, lies a healthy and viable alternative to improve
the quality of criminal justice in the region. It is possible that discretion could succeed where abstract notions of public/oral trials and endless lists of procedural safeguards failed. If the reforms wanted to
create "better" judicial models, it is likely that discretion-more than
any other feature -served this purpose.
Discretion is not an abstract notion like an "oral trial." Hence,
the only way for it to decay is by refusing its application. Discretion
was adopted in the region with concrete rules, providing specific powers. It will be up to the cultural reception of the reform in each jurisdiction to truly enjoy the possible benefits of discretion or, on the
contrary, hide behind a long-standing tradition of the "legality principle." Even better, discretion can be useful for more than dealing with
systemic pressures; it can be employed to achieve restorative and alternative solutions that satisfy the interests of defendants, victims,
and the community.
Discretion awards more than efficiency, it can award justice. It
is up to Latin American countries to embrace this possibility and to
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reject the notion that every offense deserves and must receive the
same treatment. Discretion may allow us to create differential approaches to diverse judicial necessities.

